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ABSTRACT 
 
In response to the People’s Republic of China’s intervention in the Korean War, the 
United States terminated education exchange programs and detained scientifically and 
technically trained Chinese students and intellectuals living in America. This response was partly 
an exigency of the war but was also reflective of the broader Sino-American Cold War. Utilizing 
archival material from the Truman and Eisenhower Presidential Archives, as well as published 
government documents, this paper traces the shifting patterns of American thought regarding 
education exchange and the utility of Chinese intellectuals and argues that the American 
government politicized Chinese students as early as the remission of the Boxer Indemnity Fund 
in 1905 but came to actively utilize them during the Cold War in an attempt to wage an 
intellectual war against the PRC. By retaining Chinese students, the United States hoped to deny 
China advanced scientific and technical information. It also finds that the pressures of 
constraining a large cohort of stateless individuals, whose technically illegal residence in the 
United States placed considerable administrative and financial burdens on the American 
government, led, in part, to enactment of immigration reforms during the early to mid-1950s.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In early October 1950, the SS President Cleveland, its magnificent blue and red 
smokestacks billowing acrid, black smoke, pulled out of port in Los Angeles and began its two-
week journey to Hong Kong. Ji Chaozhu stood on the deck and leaned against the railing. He 
watched the shrinking Californian coastline disappear with an ambiguous feeling. Watching the 
coastline melt into the horizon, he wondered if it would be the last time he laid eyes on the 
United States. He was leaving his adopted home of twelve years for an uncertain future in the 
newly formed People’s Republic of China (PRC). But his sense of duty called him back. A self-
professed Communist, Ji was elated at the chance to work in the construction of “New China,” a 
chance he knew required him to leave his mother behind in New York and make the long 
journey to Beijing. 
 On October 25, 1950, after two weeks at sea, Ji and his fellow Chinese passengers filed 
off the ship along a separate gangplank, isolated from those who were to remain in Hong Kong. 
Flanked by tall, turbaned Sikh policemen, the cohort of a dozen or so Chinese students were 
loaded onto a train and escorted to Luo Hu Station at the Hong Kong border. There, Ji and his 
fellow Chinese, to the sounds of cheering and the song “The East is Red” blaring over 
loudspeakers, crossed a small bridge into Mainland China. Arriving without incident, they 
returned to fulfill their various roles in the creation of the newly emergent Chinese state.1 
                                                 
1Ji Chaozhu, The Man on Mao’s Right: From Harvard Yard to Tiananmen Square, My Life Inside China’s Foreign 
Ministry (New York: Random House, 2008), 60-69. 
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 Back in California, however, another Chinese scholar, Qian Xuesen, was living under 
house arrest and preparing for a legal battle that brought charges against him of being a 
Communist and a spy. Qian, an expert in rocketry and a scientist at the California Institute of 
Technology, had originally planned to fly back to China via Canada and Hong Kong in August 
1950. Qian loaded his books and personal papers into crates and arranged to have them shipped 
to his home in Shanghai through a freight company. He purchased a plane ticket and prepared to 
make his voyage home. Yet, on August 23, agents from the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) delivered to Qian an order to remain in the country and confiscated eight crates of 
Qian’s personal papers and books. Two weeks later, on September 7, 1950, Qian was arrested 
and imprisoned at an INS detention facility in Los Angeles on charges of being a Communist and 
attempted smuggling of top-secret documents, weapons diagrams, and photos of jet engines into 
China.2  
Qian would spend the next five years trapped in the United States, disallowed from 
leaving the country, repeatedly interrogated and questioned about his political affiliations, and 
constantly monitored by the FBI. His books and personal papers, which US customs had 
impounded, were denied to him for two years and he was forbidden from leaving Los Angeles. 
When he finally returned to China in late 1955, Qian wrote that the American government’s 
actions reminded him of an old Chinese adage: “Speak words of justice and moral integrity; 
harbor the intents of thieves and whores.”3 Qian’s displeasure with the American government 
                                                 
2 “Chinese Jet Expert Held as Alien Red,” The New York Times, September 8, 1950, 12. See also Hsue-shen Tien, 
“Wo Zai Meiguo De Zaoyu [My bitter experience in the United States],” in Bazhishe xiangei zhuguo [Intellectual 
contributions for the homeland], trans. Ellen Yeung (Hong Kong: Zhoumo Bao, 1956), 47-51. Reprinted in., 
Chinese American Voices: From the Gold Rush to the Present, eds. Judy Yung, Gordon H. Chang, and Him Mark 
Lai (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 247-251; For a more detailed account of Qian’s experience in 
the United States, as well as upon his return to China, see his biography: Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm (New 
York: Basic Books, 1995). 
3 Hsue-shen Tien, “My Bitter Experience…”, 51. 
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continued through the end of his life and he never returned to the United States. Instead he 
dedicated the rest of his life to helping “the Chinese people build up the nation to where they can 
live with dignity and happiness” and assisted in the development of China’s rocketry program 
and atomic research.4  
Both Qian and Ji’s experiences in the United States represent the bifurcated pattern of 
existence and treatment that Chinese students, scholars, and intellectuals received in the early 
Cold War era from the American government. Those, like Ji, who came to pursue undergraduate 
or graduate degrees in the humanities or fine arts, were often able to return to China without 
incident. Those, like Qian, who came in pursuit of degrees in the ‘hard sciences’ and obtained 
advanced degrees in scientific and technical fields, often found themselves on the receiving end 
of punitive measures from the American government for fear that they constituted a prejudicial 
threat to American national security. While neither case is ubiquitous for the experiences of 
Chinese in America, as many other Chinese students chose to remain in the United States or 
went to Taiwan, the two experiences do help illuminate American policy toward the People’s 
Republic of China in the early Cold War era and the expansion of the Cold War into new fronts 
that sought to limit and control the dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge in order 
to leverage it for political gain. 
Between 1949 and 1955 both the American and Chinese governments attempted to use 
Chinese students in order to achieve both short and long-term political goals. In this way, these 
students represented not only a wealth of information that could be beneficial (or detrimental) to 
domestic industrial and scientific development, but became unwitting pawns in the international 
political Cold War struggle between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. While 
                                                 
4 Evan Osnos, “The Two Lives of Qian Xuesen,” The New Yorker, November 3, 2009 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/the-two-lives-of-qian-xuesen  
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their political utility shifted in conjunction with Cold War considerations, the financial and 
administrative burdens of their retention also engendered liberalizing legislative reform to 
immigration policy. Exigencies of the Sino-American Cold War thus politicized Chinese 
students and intellectuals in the international arena and forced a more liberal restructuring of 
immigration policy domestically.  
Scholarly attention to the Chinese experience in the United States is manifold. From the 
earliest Chinese sojourners to the coolies and migrant laborers of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries to the recent émigrés of the twenty-first century, scholars have devoted forests of paper 
to exploring the complex and often frustrating intricacies of Sino-American cultural exchange 
and migration. Greatly understudied within this vast body of literature, however, are the Chinese 
students and intellectuals who found themselves in a state of legal limbo following the collapse 
of the Guomindang and establishment of the People’s Republic of China. 
The earliest scholarly works focusing on these individuals emerged in the mid to late-
1950s. Sociological in approach, these works attempted to analyze the social implications and 
challenges Chinese students and intellectuals faced in their continued residence in the United 
States. Though generally less concerned with the political ramifications or exigencies that led to 
their isolation from their homeland, these studies provide valuable qualitative and quantitave 
data on this cohort. Samuel Kung’s 1955 Columbia University dissertation stands as the seminal 
work in this vein.5 Kung, with the assistance of advisor Dr. Clarence Linton (who was an 
important advocate for Chinese students and helped direct government assistance programs 
toward them), sent surveys to over 400 Chinese students and former students living in the New 
York area between 1953 and 1955. The dissertation, based on the responses of 316 Chinese 
                                                 
5 Samuel Shi-shin Kung, "Personal and Professional Problems of Chinese Students and Former Students in the New 
York Metropolitan Area" (PhD diss., Teachers College, Columbia University, 1955). 
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students, covered the issues they faced ranging from immigration, employment and economic 
concerns, educational background, and family problems. Since New York had one of the highest 
percentages of Chinese students, Kung’s dissertation can be seen as generally indicative of the 
realities faced by many Chinese students living in the United States. Kung’s work was mainly 
exploratory and sought to highlight the problems Chinese students were facing, as well as 
provide general recommendations on how their situation could be alleviated. Yet, its compilation 
of statistical data, especially concerning Chinese student attitudes toward returning to China or 
remaining in the United States, vastly expanded an otherwise unknown and little explored topic.6 
Expanding on Kung’s work, Rose Hum Lee provided the definitive sociological 
parameters of the Chinese student and intellectual group by coining the term “stranded Chinese.” 
Lee determined that 1950 served as a clear delineator for this cohort “because of their uncertain 
legal status and because their right to stay [was] based on belonging to the student group.”7 This 
group cultivated a unique identity, distinct from the rest of the Chinese then residing in the 
United States. Because most came from higher socio-economic backgrounds, many with 
connections to the Guomindang, and because of their advanced educational level, these Chinese 
faced uniquely different challenges in adapting to American society and life. Taken with Kung’s 
work, these early sociological explorations form the foundational parameters on which this study 
defines Chinese students and analyzes their responses to the limiting political atmosphere in 
early 1950s America. 
                                                 
6 See also: Lucy Huang, “Dating and Courtship Innovations of Chinese Students in America,” Marriage and Family 
Living 18, no. 1 (February 1956), 25-29. Huang explores how the isolation from the Mainland and their families led 
Chinese students and intellectuals to create innovative approaches to dating as a coping mechanism. Huang also 
finds that the gender-ratio disparity allowed Chinese women to become more selective in their partner choosing. 
Finally, Huang discusses the degree to which both Chinese men and women acculturated to American society and 
the effect this had on dating and courtship patterns. 
7 Rose Hum Lee, “The Stranded Chinese in the United States,” The Phylon Quarterly 19, no. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1958), 181. 
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One of the first historical approaches to the issues surrounding Chinese students in the 
United States during the early Cold War was Yelong Han’s “An Untold Story.” Written in 1993, 
Han focused on the interconnected imperatives of preventing scientifically and technically 
trained Chinese from returning to China and adjusting immigration legislation to legalize their 
permanent residence in the United States. These issues were connected to the objective of 
preventing China’s modernization through utilization of information determined to be 
detrimental to American national security. In this way, the long-held notion that Chinese students 
could be utilized as cultural channels to effect modernization paradigms in China was shattered 
by Cold War considerations and their knowledge became a powerful diplomatic instrument. 
Perceptions of Chinese students, therefore, shifted from viewing them as “democratic forces,” to 
measures of containment, and, finally, as expedients for a repatriation agreement with the PRC.8 
While Han contextualizes American policy regarding Chinese students and intellectuals 
within the Sino-American Cold War, the focus only on bilateral Sino-American relations 
obscures other considerations that factored into the shifting perceptions toward this cohort. 
Retention of scientifically and technically trained individuals, which began as a measure to 
prevent Communist China’s modernization, became quickly outdated as the CCP leaned heavily 
on the Soviet Union for scientific and technical training and knowledge. As entire industries and 
pedagogical models were reconfigured to conform to Soviet methodologies, the efficacy of 
preventing American-educated Chinese from returning diminished. Moreover, Han’s argument 
that the utility of Chinese students and intellectuals as “cultural channels” was smashed by Cold 
War considerations is similarly obfuscating. Through Voice of America broadcasts, the 
American government continued to rely on cultural capital, albeit more for political propaganda 
                                                 
8 Yelong Han, "An Untold Story: American Policy toward Chinese Students in the United States, 1949-1955," The 
Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993), 77-99. 
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than for modernization paradigms. Valuing Chinese students for their political merit was also not 
only limited to the American government. Domestically, the CCP started touting the return of 
American-educated Chinese as early as 1951. While this early promotion of their return was 
generally evidenced as legitimizing the Communist Party, it also highlights the political value 
that the CCP placed on them. By exploring the relationship between these individuals and the 
Communist Party, Han’s argument that the shift in perception regarding students and 
intellectuals as political expedients for a repatriation agreement can also be shown to be 
problematic. This perception, while less prevalent in the early 1950s, was present much earlier 
than the Geneva Talks in 1954-55 as Han suggests.  
More recently, Madeline Y. Hsu has focused on Chinese students and intellectuals and 
the role they played in liberalizing immigration policy. Hsu maintains that exigencies of the Cold 
War shaped American immigration policy away from racial considerations and slowly 
liberalized immigration policy based on considerations of class and cultural capital, which 
culminated in the 1965 Immigration Act. This was a result of their proven ability to be educated 
in Western styles and their demonstrated capacity to attain economic parity with their white 
counterparts; assuaging fears that removing race-based quotas to immigration would undermine 
American society or upset domestic racial hierarchies.9 
Hsu, however, views Chinese students and intellectuals as an aggregate and fails to 
distinguish between the detained cohort - those who came from the Mainland prior to 1949 and 
were subsequently placed under close scrutiny by the American government for suspected 
communist sympathies or because of their advanced knowledge - and those escaping the 
                                                 
9 Madeline Y. Hsu, “Befriending the Yellow Peril,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 16, no. 3 (Fall 
2009), 139-62; Madeline Y. Hsu, "The Disappearance of America's Cold War Chinese Refugees, 1948-1966," 
Journal of American Ethnic History 31, no. 4 (Summer 2012), 12-33. 
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communist regime and coming after 1950. Focus on the detained group greatly enhances 
understandings of immigration policy and reform and adds much needed nuance to Hsu’s 
assessment. Principally, the fiduciary and administrative burdens of maintaining a large, stateless 
cohort of individuals, coupled with active pressure from these individuals for their clearance to 
return home, ultimately forced the Eisenhower Administration into relaxing immigration laws 
and passing measures to ease their plight. 
Early efforts at education exchange between the United States and China occurred 
through a variety of private organizations. With the exception of the Qing government’s ill-fated 
Chinese Educational Mission in the late-nineteenth century, prior to 1938, the American 
government generally remained aloof from institutions of education exchange. Chapter one 
explores the history of Sino-American education exchange and the increasing involvement of 
both the Chinese and American governments in processes and institutions of education exchange 
from the Qing education mission to the impending collapse of the Nationalist Guomindang 
regime in 1948. This chapter highlights the importance American policy makers placed on the 
value of returning American-educated Chinese. Hoping they would return to China to effect pro-
American modernization campaigns, the United States government funneled resources into 
cultural and education exchange. 
Chapter two explores China’s competing modernization campaigns by looking at both 
Nationalist and Communist efforts. By focusing on China’s domestic considerations, this chapter 
highlights the value both Chinese governments placed on American-educated Chinese. 
Following the Guomindang retreat from Mainland China and the Communist Party’s subsequent 
victory, American models of education and industrial methodology were eschewed in favor of 
Soviet models. Communist reliance on the Soviet Union thus negated American attempts to 
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undermine the Communist Party’s modernization efforts. This chapter serves to contextualize 
America’s response to Chinese students and intellectuals between 1950 and 1955. 
Chapter three illuminates America’s financial assistance program to Chinese students 
studying in the United States during the final collapse of the Guomindang Party. In doing so, the 
continuity in America’s desire to return Western-educated Chinese students and intellectuals to 
effect change is highlighted. It also demonstrates the shift in perception toward Chinese students. 
Prior to 1950, it was hoped that the returning Chinese students would occupy prominent 
positions in industry and government and promote pro-American ideals. This notion remained 
constant but with the added hope that these individuals would also help undermine the 
Communist Party. In order to ensure that Chinese students and intellectuals could fulfill this 
mission, the American government increasingly saddled the financial burden of their continued 
study in the United States. 
As Chinese volunteers entered the Korean War against the United States, American 
policy makers formulated a new plan to deny China access to American scientific and technical 
knowledge by placing interdictions on the return of American-educated Chinese. Chapter four 
highlights this response and the domestic pressures and challenges Chinese students and 
intellectuals faced in the United States. The pressures of constraining these individuals also 
weighed on the American government. As a result, legislation was passed to ease the burden of 
maintaining these individuals and allow them to apply for permanent citizenship. These reforms 
mark an early liberalizing of immigration reform. 
Chapter five explores the international context and the political utility of Chinese students 
and intellectuals, from both the American and Communist Chinese perspectives. Both 
governments attempted to utilize these individuals for domestic and international concerns 
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through propaganda. Their political value ultimately manifested in diplomatic negotiations at 
Geneva in 1954 and 1955. Using the Chinese student issue to effect ambassadorial-level 
negotiations, the People’s Republic of China and the United States formalized a repatriation 
agreement exchanging American prisoners held in China for any Chinese student who wished to 
return to China. 
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CHAPTER 2  
SINO-AMERICAN EDUCATION EXCHANGE, 1874-1948 
 
At the close of the nineteenth century, when the ever-rising tide of industrial development has succeeded in 
sweeping over Europe, America, the better portion of Africa, Western Asia, and India, it is the Chinese 
Wall alone that resists its waves. The movement, however, is irresistible, and not even the exclusiveness of 
the Chinese and their extreme disinclination to change their ways will be a sufficient protection against it.10  
        - William Barclay Parsons, 1900 
 
While Parsons was correct in determining the recalcitrance on the part of Qing 
government toward Western-style modernization, the assessment that the Chinese were 
“disinclined to change” is a fallacy. Beginning in the 1870s, the Chinese government briefly sent 
to the United States a small contingent of students to learn skills that were desperately needed to 
bring China into modernity. Though this initial educational mission ended well short of its 
anticipated length, it set a precedent for increasing government involvement in education 
exchange that continued through the first half of the twentieth century. Between 1872 and 1949, 
both the American and Chinese governments increasingly transformed education exchange into a 
state function that was used to accomplish both short and long term political goals.11  
 
The first major exchange of students between the United States and China occurred in the 
late nineteenth century. An exigency of the Qing self-strengthening movement (1861-95), the 
Chinese Educational Mission (CEM) to the United States was sent in 1872 in order to expand 
upon Wei Yuan’s assertion that China must “learn from the barbarians.” Under the direction of 
                                                 
10 Wm. Barclay Parsons, An American Engineer in China (New York: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1900), 15. 
11  Li Hongshan, US-China Educational Exchange: State, Society, and Intercultural Relations, 1905-1950 (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 2. Li argues that over the course of the early twentieth century, the 
Chinese and American governments increasingly involved themselves in education exchange to accomplish both 
domestic and foreign political goals and solve crises in diplomatic affairs. Through the “visible hand,” education 
exchange became a state function and therefore influenced international relations between the United States and 
China.  
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Yung Wing, the first group of 120 Chinese students was sent to the United States for extended 
study. Ranging in age from ten to fifteen, their benefactors expected them to engage in the study 
of military and naval strategies, surveying, mining, and manufacturing; skills China desperately 
needed and would benefit from upon their return.12 However, once in the United States, the boys 
rapidly acclimatized to the American lifestyle and became willing and active participants in the 
cult of masculinity prevalent in nineteenth-century America. Baseball and football soon eclipsed 
educational pursuits for many of the boys, who embraced the rough physicality of sports over the 
Chinese scholarly way of life. Baseball, in fact, became so popular amongst the CEM boys that 
they fielded their own team, the Orientals, in the summer of 1876.13 Yet, sports were not the only 
distraction. A fellow student and, later, well-renowned professor of English at Yale, observed, 
"these boys not only excelled us Americans at athletics; you should have seen them cutting the 
double eight and the grapevine! They cut us out in other ways that caused considerable heart 
burnings…their manner to the girls had a deferential elegance far beyond our possibilities…the 
fairest and most sought-out belles invariably gave the swains from the Orient the preference."14 
While the Qing government was concerned about the boys’ increasing Americanization, 
they were mostly willing to overlook these minor transgressions. But some took the process too 
far and engendered the ire of the Qing court by cutting their queues and embracing Christianity, 
unequivocally forbidden acts according to the Qing government. This, combined with growing 
                                                 
12 Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), 60. 
13 Edward J.M. Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 
1872-81 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 144-45. 
14 Quoted from William Lyon Phelps: Autobiography and Letters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 56-59 in 
A Survey of Chinese Students in American Universities and Colleges in the Past One Hundred Years (New York: 
China Institute in America, 1954), 15. 
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anti-Chinese sentiment across the United States and generally poor management of the education 
mission, led to the disbanding of the group and recalling of the mission in 1881.15 
The recall of the Chinese Education Mission coincided with the passing of a flurry of 
conservative and harshly punitive anti-Chinese legislation. Domestically, in 1862, the United 
States prohibited the importation of Chinese workers aboard American vessels in an attempt to 
limit the spread of the ‘Yellow Peril.’ Eight years later, Congress approved the Naturalization 
Act, which disallowed Chinese from obtaining American citizenship. The Page Act of 1875 
further limited immigration of Chinese, Japanese, and other peoples of Asia in an effort to stop 
the importation of forced laborers from the Asian continent. Finally, in 1880, the American and 
Chinese governments signed the Angell Treaty, with the express purpose of limiting the 
expansion of Chinese immigration to the United States. It stipulated that the American 
government withheld the right to regulate, limit, or suspend any Chinese immigration (though 
not completely prohibit it) when the immigration of Chinese workers threatened the ‘interests’ of 
the United States or any locality within.16 However, the punitive measures of the treaty were 
strictly regulated to Chinese laborers and migrant workers and exemptions were enacted under 
Article II of the treaty, which allowed for the continuation of students, teachers, merchants, and 
“curious travelers” to come to the United States.17  
Scarcely two years later, on May 6, 1882, less than a year after the Chinese Education 
Mission was recalled to China, the Forty-Seventh Congress of the United States passed, and 
President Chester A. Arthur signed into law, the Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited all 
immigration of Chinese laborers. Though not directly intended to do so, the act had the dual 
                                                 
15 Rhoads, 168-69. 
16 “Treaty between the United States and China, concerning immigration,” November 17, 1880, US Statutes at 
Large 22 1881/1883, art. 1 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1883), 826.  
17 Ibid, 827. 
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effect of severely curtailing education exchange with China as well. For the following twenty-
three years, between the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act and the remission of the Boxer 
Indemnity Fund in 1905 (which was granted for the explicit use in education exchange), scarcely 
forty-nine Chinese students made their way to the United States to study.18 It would take a 
coalition army storming Beijing to quell the anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion and the subsequent 
massive indemnities demanded of the Chinese government to reinstate education exchange 
between the United States and China. 
Writing in the turbulent summer of 1900, Eva Jane Price, a missionary from Des Moines, 
Iowa, recorded her family’s experience: 
The whole province has been in a terrible state of unrest, for which the wicked Governor who did so much 
harm in Shan Tung [Shandong] last year is responsible. He is determined to exterminate the foreigners. In 
the latter part of June the place in Tai Yuen fu [Taiyuan] belonging to Dr. Edwards (English) was mobbed 
and burned. The foreigners fled to another place belonging to the English Baptist mission and on the street 
defended their lives by using firearms, killing a number of the mob, some say six, others say more. The 
Governor, who lives in that same city, vowed he would take three lives of foreigners for every Chinese 
killed. Miss Coombs lost her life at the time of the mob as she did not seem to escape when the others did. 
She was struck senseless and her body thrown in the burning building…Thirty-three of our friends, most of 
whom we know personally and including the two older children of Mr. Atwater of our mission who were in 
Shou Yang [Shouyang] in school, were beheaded in the presence of the Governor on July 8. Among the 
thirty-three lives were those of twelve children and two pregnant women soon expecting confinement.19 
 – Eva Jane Price, August 1, 1900 
 
The Boxer uprising in 1900 exploded with violent force as a direct backlash against foreign 
aggression within China. The secret Chinese martial arts group known as the “Righteous 
Harmonious Fists,” or “Boxers,” as they were pejoratively named by foreigners in China, laid 
                                                 
18 A Survey of Chinese in American Universities and Colleges in the Past 100 Years (New York: China Institute in 
America, 1954), 26. 
19 Viginia E. Phipps, Vernal L. Wilson, and Velma A. Caruth, China Journal 1889-1900: An American Missionary 
Family During the Boxer Rebellion (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 235, 241-42. On August 15, 1900 
Eva Jane Price and her family were to be escorted to safety under a Chinese guard. Leaving Fenzhou they were 
escorted roughly twenty miles toward the small village of Nan’an Shih where a second contingent of soldiers lay in 
wait to ambush the unsuspecting missionaries. As the group arrived at the small village the escorting guards and 
second contingent of soldiers turned on the missionaries and murdered the entire party, leaving their stripped corpses 
in a ditch on the side of the road. 
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siege to the foreign legations in Beijing, Tianjin and other foreign institutions in the Chinese 
countryside in the summer of 1900. Believing the rebellion provided an opportunity to once 
again gain legitimacy for the Qing government, the Empress Dowager Cixi allied with and 
goaded on the rebels.  Between June and August, the Boxers executed hundreds of foreigners, 
thousands of Chinese Christian converts, and harassed numerous others with constant barrages of 
rifle fire before an international coalition army was called in to quell the uprising.20  
Following the destructive summer, the foreign powers met to extract from China 
indemnities for their respective expenditures during the march to Beijing and in commercial and 
private property damage and loss.21 The Boxer Protocol, a harshly punitive “agreement” between 
the Qing and foreign nations was signed in 1901, forced large reparations onto the Chinese 
government, made them wholly dependent on foreign powers, and led to an enlargement, 
fortifying, and garrisoning of the legation in Beijing and along the railroads.22 America’s share of 
the indemnity, personally dictated by Secretary of State John Hay, was nearly double its actual 
value. While Hay most likely claimed such a large number as a bargaining chip for other 
concessions, his failure to get them left China in considerable debt to the United States. Hay and 
President William McKinley immediately set forth a plan to remit the excess funds back to 
China. However, it took another seven years to do so. 
                                                 
20 For a detailed account of the experience in the foreign legation in Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion see: Miner 
Luella, "Prisoners in Peking (1900)," in American History Told By Contemporaries V.5 (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1929), 128-132. Originally published as "A Prisoner in Peking," in Outlook, November 10,17, 24, 1900 
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The task fell to Liang Cheng, Chinese Minister to the United States, in 1905. Between 
1905 and 1909, Liang worked in Washington to prove that the United States claimed far more 
than its actual share of the indemnity and to have the excess remitted to the Chinese government, 
which was in desperate financial straits. In mid-1907, Liang convinced President Theodore 
Roosevelt to audit the Navy and Army accounts of their expenditures during the Boxer 
Rebellion. President Roosevelt quickly discovered that the Army had drastically inflated their 
claim and Liang moved to convince the Roosevelt Administration to move expeditiously toward 
resolving the indemnity question. Yet, the two sides soon reached another barricade as both had 
differing ideas of what the money should be used for.  
For their part, the Chinese government believed that the money should be remitted 
without condition. Congress, concerned that the money would end up in someone else’s hands, 
wanted the remitted funds used for education. This view was championed by William W. 
Rockhill, Commissioner to China during the Boxer Indemnity proceedings from 1900-1901. 
Americans favored this plan because it not only precluded the possibility that the money would 
be spent in Manchuria (China’s burgeoning industrial center in the northeast), or other problem 
areas that would see the money squandered, but it would also give the United States “the 
intellectual and spiritual domination of its leaders.”23 Moreover, many believed that Western 
“education will sweep away the incrustations that hamper progress, and as each improvement in 
the ranks of the official class occurs, such addition will hasten the advance and spread of 
education. Thus the downfall of one will go hand in hand with the rise of the other.”24 For most 
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in Washington, the remittance of the Boxer Indemnity Fund was a measure to ensure Beijing’s 
submission to America’s influence.  
Many in the United States believed that the Chinese coming to America would “be 
studying American institutions, making American friends, and coming back [to China] to favor 
America for China in its foreign relations.” It was also believed that Chinese students would 
“form a force in our favor so strong that no other government or trade element of Europe can 
compete with it.” However, many in the Qing government recognized the American 
machinations and sought to protect traditional Chinese values by gaining relative autonomy over 
the selection of students and general application of the remitted funds.25 Zhang Zhidong, member 
of the Qing court and proponent of controlled education reform, popularized his sentiments by 
claiming, “Western studies for practical affairs; Chinese studies for the essentials.” Zhang’s 
resistance to the State Department’s desire to appoint an American to oversee Chinese students 
in the United States stymied American plans and ultimately, secured partial Chinese control over 
the selection of Chinese students sent abroad.26 
On December 28, 1908 President Theodore Roosevelt, working with Secretary of State 
Elihu Root, signed and remitted a portion of the Boxer Indemnity back to the Chinese 
government. The remission provided funds, to be used at the discretion of the Qing government, 
to finance Chinese students’ educations in the United States and for the construction and 
operation of Tsinghua University, which would act as a preparatory university readying Chinese 
students for their study in the United States. Though a second remission followed in 1924, it was 
given instead to the China Foundation, a private organization whose focus on education and 
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culture would ensure, in American opinions, better utilization of the funds since China’s 
fractured political landscape during the mid-1920s increased the possibility that they would be 
squandered or lost. 
Qing attempts to wrest at least partial control over the application of the indemnity fund 
away from the United States very clearly highlights the primacy that Americans early on gave to 
the role of education and the belief that increasing funding and bringing Chinese students to the 
United States would allow them serve as “democratizing forces” under American influence. 
American leaders, therefore, were operating under what Michael Hunt describes as an 
“ethnocentric conviction” in America’s superiority in cultural, economic, and political values 
which discredited China’s leaders and relegated them to past modalities incapable of protecting 
and securing China’s future.27 This precedent continued to influence Washington’s policy toward 
China and Chinese students well into the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, China’s 
acquiescence to American demands and participation in the process was fundamental in the 
expansion of educational exchange. The remission of the Boxer Indemnity Fund enhanced not 
only direct government intervention in the process of education exchange, but also education 
exchange itself and began the transformation of it as an official state function instead of a 
privatized initiative.28 
The remission of the Boxer Indemnity and establishment of a dedicated fund to support 
education exchange between China and the United States brought thousands of Chinese to 
America for study. From 1909 (and especially after the overthrow of the Qing government in 
1911) to 1944, some 8,400 Chinese students came to study in the United States. The end of the 
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Second World War further escalated the number of the Chinese coming to the United States. 
Between 1945 and 1949, almost 4,700 students fled China to further their education, fully half as 
many as had come in the three and a half decades prior to the cessation of the Second World 
War.29 
During the war, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt enacted several policies which 
greatly facilitated the rapid postwar expansion in education exchange. Designed to increase 
cooperation between China and the United States, the first major initiative was the Cultural 
Cooperation Program. In 1938 the Cultural Cooperation Program focused solely on the 
American continents and Western Hemisphere. The goal of the program was to promote and 
foster friendly international relations between the United States and its neighbors on a basis of 
mutual appreciation and understanding through the dissemination of scientific and technological 
information and expansive cultural programs in the arts and education. From 1938 to 1943 
American scientists, engineers, and technical advisors were sent throughout Central and South 
America to develop programs in tidal investigation, agricultural research and experiment 
stations, fish hatcheries, and numerous others, all with the explicit aim of augmenting the 
“economic and social life” of the recipient countries.30 
The program with China began in earnest at the request of Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull, who, in November 1941, advised President Franklin D. Roosevelt that a program with 
China was “a matter of immediate concern since such a program could effectively undergird 
Chinese scientific and cultural activities during the period of national resistance and could build 
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closer understanding between China and the United States.”31 As a result, in January 1942, 
allocations were made from the President’s Emergency Fund and a program was developed to 
revolve around four basic principles: 1) Sending of technical advisors at the request of the 
Chinese government, 2) Exchange of professors, 3) Award study grants to Chinese students, and 
4) Sending microfilmed copies of American scientific and technical journals to Chinese 
universities.32 
Though the allocations for the program were never large, roughly $4.5 million split 
between China, the Western Hemisphere, and the Near East (Africa and the Middle East), the 
program provided some 550 Chinese students stranded in the United States with emergency 
financial aid to defray expenses incurred when assistance from the Chinese government and 
home dried up due to the outbreak of war.33 Moreover, the program was the first foray into active 
assistance on the part of the American government into education exchange and direct 
disbursement of financial aid from the federal government to individual Chinese students. The 
aid programs that emerged following the war, greatly expanded the government’s involvement in 
assisting Chinese students and provided them the financial resources to remain in the United 
States to complete their studies. 
As the Cultural Cooperation Program with China wound down in 1943, Chinese students 
also received an indirect form of assistance from Congress, who, beginning in May 1943, began 
deliberating on the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Many who testified for repeal of the act 
were worried about the growing influence of Japanese propaganda that widely broadcast 
America’s punitive and restrictive immigration policies to her struggling wartime ally. Japanese 
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fables, such as the story of the two yellow cocks who, while in the middle of fighting themselves, 
were able to come together and turn on the white swan when it attempted to breakup the fight, 
resonated with members of Congress, who recognized the efficacy of the fascist and communist 
elements in China in swaying popular opinion against the United States.34 Dissenters, however, 
pointed to the same growing influence of communism in China and indicated that if Chinese 
immigration were to be allowed, infiltration by even a small number of indoctrinated Chinese 
would present a serious political and economic threat to the United States.35 Despite these 
protests, the Senate passed the act on November 26, 1943 and, less than a month later, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the repeal act on December 17. 
Though largely symbolic, as adherence to the quota system, which allowed only a paltry 
105 Chinese immigrants to come to America was strictly enforced, repeal of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act did allow Chinese students to apply as immigrants with the intention of remaining 
in the United States instead of applying as specially designated nonimmigrant students. This 
ostensibly alleviated their position since those currently in the United States and those coming 
for study were eligible to apply for naturalization and, eventually, citizenship.36 
Following the cessation of the Second World War, the United States markedly loosened 
the definition of what constituted a student in order to accommodate its erstwhile wartime allies. 
For China, this meant a drastic increase in the number of students sent abroad. The most 
important reason for this increase was the need for national reconstruction. The Nationalist 
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Guomindang government, from its inception, was concerned with industrialization and creating a 
new, modern China. To this end, the Chinese government focused on practical education to meet 
China’s immediate needs and between 1931 and 1936 the number of Chinese students studying 
engineering and science more than doubled in state run institutions.37 This shift clearly 
symbolizes the focus on practical education that would directly benefit Chinese industry and 
economy. Moreover, this shift in focus on the importance of technical and scientific knowledge 
was reflected in the fields of study of Chinese students coming abroad.  
In 1946 the American government, through the Foreign Economic Administration and 
China Supply Commission, brought around 1,000 Chinese students to study in American 
factories and industries as technical trainees for a period of one year. In conjunction with various 
federal departments, these students received practical training in mechanical and electrical 
engineering, forestry, transportation, oil refining, and numerous other technical fields.38 It was 
hoped that this practical technical training could then be directly applied to Chinese industry. 
This, however, was a short-term measure intended to work in conjunction with traditional 
university students, who came to the United States to study engineering, medicine, agriculture, 
and other scientific and technical fields.  
To finance their education in the United States, many Chinese students benefited from a 
favorable exchange rate of Chinese yuan for American dollars. Chinese students, up to 1947, 
who were going abroad with the express purpose of education, were allowed to purchase 
American dollars at an exchange rate of 20 yuan to 1 dollar. This changed in February 1947, 
when inflation and economic downturn in China led to a sharp rise in the exchange rate. Through 
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the rest of 1947 exchange rates remained near 12,000 yuan to 1 American dollar. This again 
changed drastically in 1948 when, in August, exchange rates jumped to 12,000,000 yuan to one 
dollar and in November 60,000,000 yuan to one dollar.39 
The collapse of the GMD in 1948 precipitated financial hardship for the several thousand 
Chinese students and scholars in the United States. Many who had been recipients of Chinese 
government scholarships and grants now found themselves isolated and cut off from financial 
resources. Yet, many American policymakers sympathized with the plight of these Chinese 
scholars and enacted financial assistance policies to alleviate their burden. Many Americans still 
believed that these Chinese constituted the best hope for dissuading the expansion of 
communism in China since, upon completion of their studies, they would return to take 
prominent leadership positions within the Chinese government.40 
 
The first educational mission to the United States was aborted rather shortly in the face of 
growing anti-Chinese sentiment and the poor performance of the Chinese students sent abroad. 
However, after the Boxer Rebellion and the return of the Boxer Indemnity Fund, the United 
States increasingly became an educational destination for thousands of Chinese. The faltering 
Qing attempted briefly to stymie the flow and ensure that only highly qualified students were 
sent abroad but the overthrow of the Qing government in 1911 silenced this opposition. For the 
next 39 years Chinese students came by the hundreds every year to learn crucially needed skills 
to assist in the construction of a modern China. While the United States still strictly enforced 
exclusionary laws against Chinese laborers and immigrants, Chinese students found more and 
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more doors being thrown open for them to come and study, provided they promptly returned to 
China after their studies. 
Yet, it was not until the late 1930s and the advent of the Second World War that Chinese 
students found themselves highly sought after by the American government. The rise of global 
fascism and communism, ideologies interpreted as directly antithetical to the American way of 
life, focused American politicians, educators, missionaries, and businessmen on the role that 
Chinese students could play as democratizing forces – turning them into “unofficial 
ambassadors” for the United States.  
Between 1938 and 1950 the American government increasingly involved itself in 
education exchange as a way to ensure that postwar global affairs evolved along the American 
line. Chinese scholars and students found new opportunities opening for them every year and 
financial assistance in myriad forms. Both the Guomindang and American governments were 
dedicated to ensuring that a highly trained cadre of Chinese scholars and students were able to 
return to China and develop the war torn country into a modern, industrialized nation. Yet, in 
1948, the illusory dream of creating a pro-American modern China came crashing down as the 
Guomindang government repeated military setbacks against Chinese Communist forces. The 
beginning of the end came in 1948 as Nationalist forces were routed and the government fled to 
Taiwan, stranding several thousand Chinese students and scholars in the United States. 
Over the first half of the twentieth century, the American and Chinese governments 
increasingly relied on utilizing education exchange to achieve both short and long term political 
goals. The Nationalist Guomindang government sent students to the United States in order to 
learn scientific and technical skills that were desperately needed to modernize the Chinese 
economy and industry. These students returned to China with the hope of being able to apply 
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their knowledge to the Chinese reality but the exigencies of both the civil war and war against 
Japan meant they seldom had the opportunity to enact meaningful change with the full support of 
the government. The United States sought to direct the development of Chinese modernization 
by utilizing educational exchange and believed that bringing students and scholars to the United 
States would instill in them an appreciation of the American way of life and make them 
sympathetic to the American cause in China. From the remission of the Boxer Indemnity Fund 
through the Second World War, the American government consistently instituted programs with 
this express purpose in mind. The impending collapse of the Nationalist government in 1948 did 
little to dissuade American policymakers from striving toward this goal. It was not until the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, and their subsequent 
involvement in the Korean War in late 1950, that the American government terminated exchange 
programs with China as a measure of denying them access to scientific and technical knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMPETING MODERNITIES:  
NATIONALIST AND COMMUNIST VISIONS OF NEW CHINA 
 
Increasing education exchange between the United States and China coincided with a 
concerted effort on the part of the Chinese government to rapidly modernize and industrialize. 
Yet, the fractured political situation in China often thwarted most efforts at full-scale 
industrialization. Parallel patterns of economic, social, and industrial development were common 
for most of the early twentieth century in China as the Communists and Nationalists competed 
for control over the future of China’s development.  
The Nationalist Guomindang government, oscillating between varying degrees of partial 
control over eastern China, attempted to modernize the Chinese economy and industry by 
seeking help from the United States. Their focus was on practical scientific and technical 
education that could rapidly meet the demands of the Chinese reality. The Communists, 
relegated to the sparsely populated and technologically backward area of northwestern China, 
focused on agricultural development and reform for much of the early twentieth century. Though 
Mao Zedong and other communist leaders recognized the importance of scientific and technical 
education, it would not be until they gained control over Mainland China that they could institute 
policies, not drastically dissimilar from the Guomindang, to increase the scientific and technical 
literacy of China and rapidly modernize the nation, albeit along Soviet, not American, lines. 
 
After receiving the first Boxer Indemnity remission check in January 1909, the Qing 
court, over the protestations of many in the Ministry of Education, decided that it would send to 
America a large contingent of students to study engineering, science, agriculture, and business. 
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with the American government, determined that 
students studying in these fields would comprise roughly 80% of the cohort sent to the United 
States, with the other 20% studying in the humanities and non-scientific or technical fields.41 
This basic pattern of focusing on scientific and technical studies at the expense of China’s social 
necessities remained unchanged after the establishment of the Guomindang government and 
drew sharp criticism from Chinese contemporaries in the 1920s.  
Basing his ideas off Soviet engineer Peter Palchinsky’s notion of a “Tekhintern,” Sun 
Yat-sen envisioned for China an industrial revolution, led by a scientific and technocratic elite, 
which would transform the Chinese nation into a fully industrialized global economic power.42 
However, Sun’s death in 1925 stifled his ideas of a technocracy and left development of China’s 
industrial future to Chiang Kai-shek. Under Chiang’s tutelage, the Nationalist government 
engaged in a program of nationalization that placed responsibility for national economic 
development firmly within the purview of the government. This policy, not unlike the CCP’s 
policy after 1949, constricted the private sector and relegated national construction to 
“bureaucratic superagencies” run by engineers, who focused more on building and “getting 
things done,” regardless of what the country could afford.43 For the Nationalists, scientific and 
technical education was seen as a panacea for China’s problems. Ostensibly, American trained 
engineers and scientists would return from abroad to assist in the national construction of New 
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China. Yet, the ambivalent attitude toward Western educated Chinese presented a duality for 
many.  
The Nationalist policy, decried Shu Xingcheng, suffered from a lack of direction and 
purpose, failed to coordinate policies amongst institutions sending students abroad, failed to 
adequately screen students before sending them abroad, concentrated students too heavily in the 
United States and Japan, and recruited unevenly from the coastal provinces instead of from 
China’s interior.44 The most damning critique of study abroad, however, was the overt 
Westernization of students who received foreign educations and their disinterest in helping 
modernize China upon their return.45 Despite the criticisms, the Guomindang continued to send 
students abroad with the intention of increasing China’s scientific and technical modernization 
programs, which were at the heart of their national construction schemes.  
A vast majority of students who returned from the United States were often marginalized 
by the Guomindang and usually found positions in education rather than government. This was 
facilitated by the adoption of the American educational model throughout most of China in 1922. 
As a result, by 1937, sixty-nine out of ninety-four full professors at Tsinghua University had 
received their education in the United States. This was also reflected in the prestigious Academia 
Sinica, which, by 1948, employed eighty-one research fellows, fifty-two of whom received 
education in the United States.46  
Despite the higher propensity for many to retreat into education, most returning Chinese 
students desired to find jobs in their fields of study. However, many large projects required 
funding from the government, funding that was being squandered on factional warfare. The large 
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projects that did receive funding were usually financed by foreign corporations that preferred to 
hire foreign engineers, not Chinese. The result was that many returning Chinese students had 
little choice but to fall into education.47 
Regardless of the Guomindang’s ambivalence toward American educated Chinese 
students, they continued to send students abroad in unprecedented numbers. As previously 
mentioned, the most concerted effort on behalf of the Chinese government came during and after 
the Second World War. Once the Japanese threat to United States reached a critical point, the 
Roosevelt Administration focused its attention on alleviating China’s domestic turmoil and 
keeping them in the fight. Increased American support and money thus facilitated the 
Guomindang’s ability to send students overseas. Financial aid and education exchange programs 
such as the Cultural Cooperation Program and the Fulbright Act of 1946 injected much needed 
capital into the Chinese economy and allowed Chinese students to study abroad. These programs 
also diminished the financial burden on the Guomindang in sending students abroad. Yet, by 
1948, as the Guomindang’s stewardship over Mainland China began to falter and yield to the 
Communists, so too did American prestige and influence. 
The declining American presence in China coincided with the rise of Soviet influence as 
the Chinese Communist Party gained control over Mainland China. Like Chiang, Mao adopted 
an often oscillating and contradictory stance toward modernization along foreign paradigms.48 
He was at once intensely nationalistic, favoring and advocating self-reliance and finding a 
“Chinese road,” but was also a pragmatist who realized the importance of foreign aid and 
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assistance in constructing a New China. The contradiction between dependence and 
independence was a central theme in Mao’s thought through the 1950s and manifested itself 
most prevalently in the PRC’s relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Interparty relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) had a long and torrid history. Stalin’s recalcitrance in fully supporting 
the CCP left a lasting impression on the Chinese Communists. Regardless, Mao and the CCP 
consistently declared their loyalty and adherence to the Soviet Party line. Mao elucidated this 
clearly on the eve of the Second World War when he stated that the constitution adopted at the 
first All-China Soviet Congress “declares its readiness to form a revolutionary united front with 
the world proletariat and all oppressed nations, and proclaims the Soviet Union, the land of the 
proletarian dictatorship, to be its loyal ally.”49 However, while outwardly adhering to the Soviet 
Party line, the Chinese communists were fostering self-reliance within the Chinese Soviets. 
During the First Revolutionary Period, as Chiang’s Nationalist forces besieged the 
Chinese Communists, the CCP developed isolated spheres of influence. These independent 
Soviets were the CCP’s first test at implementing socialist policies. It was during this period, in 
the early 1930s, that Mao first wrote about the importance of economic work. Against popular 
sentiment within the CCP, Mao advocated for a viable, independent economic base. Self-
reliance, argued Mao, was the only way to prevent unscrupulous merchants from exploiting the 
Chinese Soviets who were forced to pay exorbitant prices for goods due to the Nationalist 
blockade of the Soviet base areas.50 This policy of self-reliance, though initially meant to apply 
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to the local base areas, would later be adapted for use on the national stage in the latter half of 
the 1950s and justify the reduction of Chinese dependence on Soviet aid. 
Mao’s espousal of self-reliance also served to differentiate the Chinese Communist Party 
from the Nationalist Guomindang because, according to Mao, “under the [Guomindang] 
government there is dependence on foreign aid countries for everything.”51 For Mao, this meant 
that the Guomindang was subject to the whims of foreign governments and conducted a 
“consistently wrong policy of compromise in foreign affairs.”52 Overreliance on foreign aid was 
detrimental to the Chinese economy and served only to retard China’s economic and industrial 
development.53 Mao, instead, resolved to lean toward the Soviet side and claimed, “solidarity 
with our foreign friends will enable us to accomplish our work of construction rapidly…as long 
as we keep to our style of plain living and hard struggle, as long as we stand united and as long 
as we persist in the people’s democratic dictatorship and unite with our foreign friends, we shall 
be able to win a speedy victory on the economic front.”54 Leaning to the Soviet side meant 
economic, military, and educational assistance, as well as an “upsurge of construction in the 
cultural sphere,” which ended “the era in which the Chinese people were regarded as 
uncivilized.”55 
In 1948, as the Communist Party was making significant gains toward control over 
Mainland China, the Soviet Union abandoned their aloof stance toward the CCP and sent a small 
contingent of advisors to China. As such, when Mao formally declared the formation of the 
People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949 around 600 Soviet advisors were already 
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stationed in China. As the decade progressed, the Soviet advisory campaign intensified and 
assisted the Chinese Communist Party in reestablishing their economic base. This campaign 
became one of the most critical aspects of Soviet assistance to the PRC. Between 1949 and 1960 
an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 nonmilitary advisors served in China.56 
Relegated to small, rural Soviet base areas since the 1920s, the Chinese Communist Party 
had little practical experience in managing a national economy. In order to rectify this, Mao 
formulated a plan in 1948 to begin devoting resources and time to train Chinese economists in 
management of the national economy. In June 1949 Mao proclaimed that the Chinese “must 
learn what we do not know. We must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no 
matter who they are…At first some of the Soviet Communists also were not very good at 
handling economic matters…under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, [they] learned not only 
how to make the revolution but also how to carry on construction. [They have] built a great and 
splendid socialist state. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we 
must learn from it.”57 Between 1950 and 1953, roughly 1,000 to 1,200 Soviet advisers were sent 
to the PRC to assist with economic reconstruction. Due to the lack of qualified individuals in the 
PRC, many of these Soviet experts actually ended up directly managing economic affairs for a 
short period.58 
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After the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual 
Assistance on February 14, 1950, additional technical and scientific advisory groups streamed 
into China. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, as a result of the treaty, extended a line of credit to 
the PRC. Over the next five years, a US $300 million loan was given to the Chinese at an annual 
interest rate of one percent.59 While generous,60 Mao perceived these loans with a negative 
connotation, believing they would make the CCP too reliant and susceptible to Soviet 
influence.61 However, these loans made it possible for the PRC to import desperately needed 
construction and engineering materials from the Soviet Union. The treaty also outlined the 
establishment of three Sino-Soviet joint stock companies in 1950 - The Sino-Russian Civil 
Aviation Corporation, the Sino-Russian Petroleum Corporation of Xinjiang, and the Corporation 
for the mining of non-ferrous and rare metals. Both the CCP and CPSU had equal rights, shares 
of stock, and respect for sovereignty rights in these companies.62  
While intended to help both the Chinese and the Soviets, Mao and the CCP were 
convinced these were further indications of Soviet insincerity and examples of Soviet 
“chauvinism.”63 The Soviet press, however, heralded this as just another example of Soviet 
magnanimity towards their Chinese comrades. Claiming that the Soviet Union, through selfless, 
genuine aid, provided the planes, aviation equipment, and all the industrial materials for the joint 
ventures. The aid provided so selflessly, they claimed, was another further distinction between 
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the truly fraternal aid socialists provided one another and the aid given by the imperialists of the 
West and the United States.64 The Soviet Press further claimed that, in order to aid in the 
construction and establishment of the joint ventures, 200 Soviet experts were sent to the PRC 
with explicit instructions from Stalin to teach the Chinese everything they knew.65 To do this 
special education centers were established and staffed by Soviet personnel. These technical 
centers were focused on teaching the Chinese workers advanced Soviet production techniques. In 
addition, a select number of Chinese workers were permitted to go to Moscow to learn in 
technical schools, while Chinese students, provided they had the proper political pedigree, were 
sent to the Soviet Union to study.66  
The impact of Soviet advisers was immediate and within a year of their arrival, numerous 
demonstrations were staged to display the effect Soviet knowledge and aid had on China’s 
industrialization effort. Chinese state media focused intently on the increases in efficiency that 
Soviet techniques rendered. Toolmakers in Beijing publicly demonstrated the 12-30% increase in 
efficiency that Soviet techniques produced.67 The adoption of the Kovalev Method, which had 
“workers on the same operation study the differences in their methods, select the most skilled 
aspects of each, and combine these into a standard method which is then popularized among all 
who do similar work,”68 led Chinese workers to innovate new techniques, achieve higher 
efficiency, and engage in competition with other factories and workers. With more efficient 
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means of production came big yields. By the end of 1950 the Chinese Communist Party claimed 
steel production had surpassed 1936 levels (the year before Japan invaded Manchuria).69 More 
examples of Soviet production techniques can be seen across numerous areas of the Chinese 
economy. 
By the middle of 1952 Soviet experts had “generously sent the most experienced 
specialists and technical experts to China.”70 Soviet experts helped not only increase production 
but also helped establish “a most modern technical foundation.” Agricultural specialists helped 
the Chinese adopt new logging methods, which lowered the cut point and saved over 300,000 
cubic feet of lumber annually. Introduction of the dense-plant method of cotton cultivation 
allowed for a cotton harvest four times larger than usual. Animal husbandry experts introduced 
artificial insemination in 1951 and tripled procreativity. Blast furnace production rose from 250 
tons to 376 tons in 1950.71 Flood protection and the building of dams led to a roughly 16% 
decrease in flood areas along the Yellow River, while construction of Hydroelectric dams 
harnessed electricity from both the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers.72 The Chinese railway system 
also received a complete overhaul. Between 1950 and 1952, the Chinese and Soviets worked to 
restore thousands of miles of track. Soviet experts also helped redesign railway cars with an 
increased carrying capacity and distance. Special education centers were set up along the 
railways to teach the Chinese how to operate the railway.73 In 15 months the Xingang (Tianjin) 
Port in North China was built, allowing ships up to 10,000 tons to import and export goods into 
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Northern China.74 According to Chinese and Soviet state media, these “outstanding 
achievements would have been quite impossible but for the equipment and materials furnished 
by the Soviet Government and particularly the invaluable technical advice given by the Soviet 
experts working in China.”75 
Within the first three years of Soviet technical assistance, the Chinese economy had been 
drastically altered. Soviet specialists introduced new methods of production and efficiency into 
almost every aspect of the Chinese economy. The Chinese, for their part, took learning from the 
Soviet advisers very seriously. The Soviets were seen as infallible and the Chinese were willing 
to bend over backwards in order to placate them. During the first few years of the aid campaign, 
problems were attributed to inattentiveness on the part of the Chinese or their translators; never 
to the Russians.76 The Chinese often found the Soviet advisers to be very demanding but, despite 
their exasperation, did not dare criticize the Soviets. Instead, their instructions were followed to 
the letter.77 The importance of learning from the Soviet Union was tantamount to the 
construction of New China and, therefore, became the responsibility of each and every person to 
learn everything they could.  
The industrial and economic sectors were not the only areas in which Soviet influence 
penetrated. Higher education was reorganized along Soviet models to facilitate the 
industrialization and modernization process. Typically, Chinese education followed a Western 
(i.e. American) style model, which stressed broad education in not just the sciences, but the arts 
and humanities as well. Attention was given to electives and students were expected to graduate 
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with a broad, well-rounded knowledge of several subjects, with specialized training obtained on 
the job. In many ways this was similar to traditional Chinese education, which focused almost 
exclusively on the humanities. Criticism of American-style education focused on its inability to 
achieve China’s immediate demands and rapidly produced engineers, scientists, and technicians 
who could contribute to the industrialization process. Though the Guomindang initially began 
the shift toward focusing China’s higher education on training engineers and technicians, in line 
with Sun Yat-sen’s borrowed notion of a “tekhintern” as discussed at the beginning of the 
chapter, it was the Communists who brought this to fruition. Education under Communist rule 
was made to serve the state and, therefore, needed to be practical and applicable to the 
construction of new China. 
Reorganization of higher education was adopted in the middle of 1950 and, on November 
7, 1950, the CCP formally announced that reforms to simplify curriculum and reorganize 
departments within universities were well underway. Reorganization focused on technical 
education, which was complemented by a shift away from “knowledge for knowledge’s sake.” 
Instead, the CCP favored and adopted highly specialized degrees and programs that would 
function to immediately benefit the Chinese people.78 In the field of agriculture, courses in plant 
pathology were added to help fulfill the agricultural demands of the new state, while language 
instruction courses in Russian were also added to facilitate the transfer of information between 
Soviet advisors and Chinese students. Attention was also given to creating a unified teaching 
style. Adoption of Soviet pedagogical methods resulted in the implementation of collective study 
and teaching groups.79 
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Believing that the Guomindang educational structure focused too much on theory at the 
expense of practical experience, Communist education reforms intended to link theory with 
practice. Thus, American implemented educational models and general universities, those 
focusing on electives and broad education, were elided in favor of Soviet-style polytechnical and 
technical institutes. These were designed to maximize and streamline the education process and 
churn out engineers and technically qualified individuals as fast as possible. Reliance on Soviet 
educational models also meant that professors and educators were compelled to adopt Soviet 
textbooks and utilize as much Soviet material in their courses as possible.80 
The overt reliance on Soviet experts for reorganizing Chinese higher education 
manifested in a more or less wholesale adoption of Soviet pedagogy during the first several years 
of the People’s Republic. This changed in 1956, especially once Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev made his ‘secret speech’ denouncing Stalin at the CPSU’s 20th Party Congress.81 
The decline in Sino-Soviet relations, at least in the educational sphere, resulted in a withdrawal 
of Soviet advisors and education experts at the end of the 1956-57 academic year.82 The 
following year, Mao Zedong initiated the Anti-Rightist Campaign and purged all non-loyal 
intellectuals who had mistakenly criticized the government during the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign in 1956. 
 
Beginning in the 1920s, both polities sought assistance from foreign nations 
(predominantly the United States and Soviet Union) but remained ambivalent about the efficacy 
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of foreign education. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist Guomindang 
government, and Mao Zedong were first and foremost nationalists, who, pragmatically, 
recognized the necessity of relying on outside help but did not want to compromise the essential 
Chinese character of the nation and favored modernization along a Chinese path. Wholesale 
importation of foreign ideas and methods remained a constant issue for both governments 
throughout the twentieth century but, within the Chinese context, ultimately fell to the 
Communists to rectify.83 
After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party leaned heavily on the Soviet Union to rapidly 
modernize and industrialize the nation. The policy of “leaning to one side” dictated the CCP’s 
early industrial efforts and, regardless of their ambivalence, permeated nearly every facet of 
China’s mid-century modernization campaigns. The United States’ policies regarding Chinese 
students can only be understood within this context. The overt reliance on the Soviet Union made 
China, in American minds, a mere satellite of the communist giant and, therefore, a threat to 
American security. Policies instituted to disallow Chinese students from returning (or influence 
them to stay) were partially a response to the CCP’s close allegiance to the Soviet Union and an 
attempt to deny the newly formed communist nation access to scientific and technical 
information.  
The Communists, however, relied principally on Soviet expertise and, by adopting Soviet 
methodologies for industrial development and pedagogies for education reform, mitigated any 
effect that denying the return of American-trained Chinese students may have had. Moreover, the 
overt reliance on the Soviet Union led to a reorganization of higher education, which shunned 
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American-style education models, marginalized Western-educated intellectuals, and relegated 
them to a peripheral status within the People’s Republic of China. As such, those who chose to 
return in 1949-50 found few outlets for their knowledge, while those who were disallowed from 
returning until 1955 faced even more dire consequences since they returned just in time to 
encounter the anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957. Though some high profile intellectuals, such as 
Qian Xuesen, were fortunate enough to escape the Communist purge, most American-educated 
Chinese found a less than hospitable environment for their knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FROM ASSISTANCE TO ARREST, 1948-50 
 
The last ten days have been an endless series of riots in Canton and Shanghai, both bad spots for such 
things. There has been a lot of burning in Canton, and in Shanghai the Mayor, a very good and gutty guy, 
was badly beaten up while the taxi dancers tore shops and restaurants to pieces. No one incident has much 
meaning in itself, but the piling up does. Even the cheeriest and blindest of souls now find and uneasy 
soughing in the wind. Not least of the contributory factors is the vacillation and ineptitude of the 
Government at a time when it should be decisive and strong if it would avoid even worse trouble…military 
developments of the past few weeks have put the Communists in a position where they have practical 
control over all China north of the Yangtze except for a few urban enclaves and some lines of 
communication; parallel economic deterioration continues despite all remedial action; paralysis within the 
Government prevents formulation of effective remedies, to say nothing of implementation; and, despite the 
presence of a number of good and able men who know what needs to be done, there is growing conviction 
that any amount of American aid will be useless in turning the tide.  
– John F. Melby, February 3, 194884 
 
The impending collapse of the Nationalist Guomindang regime in 1948 left the financial 
burden of supporting Chinese students in the United States almost completely on the American 
government. The Truman Administration, beginning in 1948, diverted allocations from the China 
Area Aid Act toward this goal, while also developing contingencies for their China policy. 
Disbursement of these allocations was left to the discretion of the State Department. Over the 
next seven years the Department of State developed a financial assistance program to ease the 
financial burden of stranded Chinese students and scholars. It was also hoped that this assistance 
would influence their decision to remain in the United States. Assisting Chinese students and 
scholars living in the United States, however, was only one aspect of a comprehensive plan 
designed to deny access to scientific and technical information to the Chinese Communist Party. 
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The domestic situation in China had reached a critical point by the beginning of 1948. 
The Nationalist army, though superior in manpower and hardware, suffered near constant defeat 
at the hands of the People’s Liberation Army, riots were breaking out in the major urban areas, 
and rampant inflation devastated the Chinese economy. Not yet ready to abandon the 
Guomindang, Congress appropriated $338 million in April under Title IV of the Economic 
Cooperation Act of 1948 specifically for economic assistance to Nationalist China. Yet, the aid 
came too late to save the Guomindang. Moreover, it barely managed to feed “several millions of 
people who otherwise would have been hungrier than they were,” and allowed a handful of 
industries to continue production longer than they otherwise would have.85 By the end of that 
summer, Secretary of State George Marshall and his director of policy planning, George Kennan, 
recognized the hopelessness of the situation in China and estimated that roughly 35% of the 
Chinese people and nearly a quarter of Chinese territory were already under communist 
control.86 Believing that Chiang and the Guomindang had “exhausted the Mandate of Heaven,” 
Kennan and others in the State Department recommended a gradual withdrawal of American 
financial support to the Nationalist regime and adoption of a “wait-and-see” policy toward the 
situation in China.87  
It was within this context that, on September 22, 1948, the Chinese Embassy in the 
United States issued a circular to Chinese students and scholars imploring those who had 
completed all or a stage of their education to immediately return to China. An extension would 
be granted to those students whose education required another semester to complete, but those 
who had finished were desperately needed to place their “special talent at the disposal of the 
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country.”88 The Chinese Embassy also provided a subsidy for those who required financial 
assistance in securing return passage to China. This appeal was primarily aimed at the “second 
group” of Chinese students who had passed the qualifying exams in 1946 and came to the United 
States during the 1947-48 academic year. The remaining Chinese studying in the United States 
still faced a desperate financial situation and the Guomindang was more or less powerless to 
assist them. Moreover, as the Communists gained ground many Chinese students studying in 
America became isolated from their families. This isolation, and subsequent termination of 
financial support from their families, forced an increased dependence on the American 
government for continued financing of their education.89 
While American policy makers in the postwar era hoped to drastically increase the 
number of foreign students choosing the United States as an education destination, they 
maintained a deferential attitude in regards to providing financial assistance for foreign students. 
Official policy in Washington held foreign governments responsible for the financial concerns of 
their respective students. However, the rapidly deteriorating situation in China precipitated direct 
government intervention on behalf of Chinese students and scholars. Toward the end of 
September, $13,000 was made available to the China Institute in America in New York City 
from the Office of Education for alleviation of financial hardship for students from the Eastern 
Hemisphere. Students requesting assistance needed to provide an application and a letter from 
the foreign student advisor at their college or university that stated how a one time grant of $100 
would help stave off financial trouble. Not intended to act as a stopgap measure, the one time 
grant was awarded only to students who could prove that the award would completely solve their 
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financial problems and was ineligible for covering travel expenses.90 Though disbursements were 
made through the China Institute in America, few Chinese students actually benefited from this 
fund since it was intended to encompass students from all over the Eastern Hemisphere. Most 
Chinese applicants were in such a desperate financial situation that they were disqualified from 
receiving the grant, since a $100 remittance would not completely solve their financial 
difficulties. As a result, only a few Chinese students were able to take advantage of this 
assistance program. 
While beneficial for some, the small allocation was quickly depleted and, by January 
1949, the situation for Chinese students was as critical as ever. Recognizing the desperate 
financial issues that numerous foreign students faced, Dr. Clarence Linton, Professor of 
Education at Columbia University, along with Chih Meng, Director of the China Institute in 
America, Harry H. Pierson, Program Director for the Institute of International Education, and 
several other leading educators in the New York area, met and drafted a memorandum for the 
State Department. In the memorandum, they appealed to the State Department to provide 
emergency financial aid to help the nearly 5,000 foreign students whose financial situation had 
deteriorated to the point that many were unable to afford tuition and would be forced to withdraw 
from school. Fully half of the 5,000 in desperate need were Chinese students, whose financial 
situation was among the worst. Dr. Linton and his colleagues placed the minimum amount of 
financial support at $2,500,000 to cover these students through the spring semester but 
recognized that millions more would be needed over the next several years.91 Less than a month 
later, on February 10, the Board of Trustees for the China Institute in America received a similar 
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report. This report, which concerned only the 3,610 Chinese students in America, claimed that 
assistance for only Chinese students in the United States would cost around $2,500,000.92  
Despite the small and sporadic allocations from the American government, the 
responsibility for Chinese students in 1948 and early 1949 typically fell to private entities and 
the universities themselves. Some, like the University of Michigan, took steps to alleviate 
financial hardship by offering Chinese graduate students assistantships and long-term loans that 
held students’ degrees as collateral until repayment of the loan. For undergraduates who did not 
qualify to receive an assistantship, local community leaders often hosted lecture series or public 
speaking forums for which Chinese students would be compensated for speaking at.93 The 
problem encountered by many Chinese students were restrictive immigration laws. Because 
many Chinese students had come to the United States on a student visa, they were expressly 
disqualified from obtaining any form of employment. Barred from working legally and 
financially isolated from familial assistance, the growing number of Chinese students facing 
financial destitution placed a heavy burden on the supportive structures of universities and 
private enterprises; a financial responsibility they simply could not bear.  
The Chinese government, which had encouraged students in the United States to return to 
China, appealed to Roger Lapham in early February for assistance in dealing with the students 
struggling financially in the United States. Lapham, Director of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration’s (ECA) China mission, agreed and recommended on February 16 that $500,000 
be reappropriated from the ECA’s budget and directed toward alleviating the financial burden of 
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Chinese students. Shortly after making this statement, Lapham left from Shanghai for 
Washington DC where he met with members of The Committee on Foreign Affairs in 
Congress.94 From March 15-25 the Committee heard testimony from Lapham and other officials 
in the ECA and Department of State. Due to the fluid and uncertain situation in China in early 
1949, the Committee recommended, on March 28, to amend the China Aid Act of 1948. 
Under Title IV of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, a separate program for assistance 
to China was developed. This program was originally appropriated $338,000,000, of which 
$275,000,000 was made available to the ECA’s China mission. Aid to China consisted primarily 
of a commodity program to finance importation of foodstuffs and other goods, industrial 
replacement and reconstruction programs, and a Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction with 
the Guomindang government, but the civil war in China stifled any serious enactment of these 
programs. As a result, roughly $54,000,000 of the $275,000,000 appropriation remained 
unobligated. The Committee’s recommendation to Congress, therefore, was to allow the 
President to use, at his discretion, the unexpended funds in order to meet the demands of the 
Chinese situation.  As chief of the ECA’s China mission, Lapham’s recommendation that 
$500,000 be appropriated to assist Chinese students in the United States was also taken under 
advisement. On March 30, the ECA officially announced that they would turn over $500,000 to 
the Department of State for emergency aid to Chinese students. 
At the discretion of the State Department, Chinese students could apply through their 
university for assistance from the program. Awards would cover tuition, maintenance, and travel, 
but were limited only to the amount necessary to cover the completion of an “immediate and 
approved educational objective” and, upon completion of this objective, the student was required 
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to return immediately to China to make their knowledge and skill available to the Chinese 
government.95 As with the fund made available in September 1948, aid was limited only to 
students currently enrolled in a university or college program but carried a further stipulation that 
made this aid available only to Chinese students who were pursuing a degree in scientific or 
technical fields. Any Chinese student enrolled in a program in the arts, languages, religion, or the 
humanities was disqualified from receiving assistance under this program. This qualification was 
enacted in order to ensure that the $500,000 from the ECA fund could be “construed as assisting 
in the reconstruction of China.”96 Despite the curtailment of assistance to only students seeking 
degrees in the sciences and technical fields, applications for financial aid came in at such a 
volume that the appropriated fund was exhausted by August and had only been able to award 266 
Chinese students financial aid.97 State Department and ECA officials had severely 
underestimated the need of Chinese students and quickly came to realize that in order to enact 
any meaningful program, more funds would be required.  
In early July, Minnesota Representative Walter H. Judd put forward a bill recommending 
a further appropriation of $4,000,000, to be taken from the unexpended $54,000,000 ECA fund 
under President Truman’s discretion, to be used for assisting Chinese students. Judd, an avowed 
anti-communist, lived in China as a medical missionary between 1925 and 1930 and again in 
1933 before being forced from China by the encroaching Japanese army. Believing that the 
United States could make Chinese students “advocates of our system as opposed to the 
Communists [sic] if we can give them the education they have started,” Judd’s bill proposed to 
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cover the financial burden of nearly 4,000 Chinese students stranded in the United States.98 The 
proposal to divert another $4,000,000 was well received and passed in the House of 
Representatives on August 1 and written into the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act, 1950. Under 
this act, President Truman was authorized to allocate $4,000,000 to the Secretary of State to be 
used for tuition, subsistence, and return passage to China until the fund was exhausted.99 
Intensely concerned over Chinese Communist propaganda, which had been excoriating 
the United States for their actions in China, many Americans believed that passage of the Judd 
bill would help foster goodwill on the part of the Chinese toward America and counter 
Communist claims of imperial aggression. As such, the Judd bill was presented as yet another 
example of the Sino-American “special relationship” and “an action that is manifestly unselfish, 
obviously moved by no design more sinister than the wish to help those who are in need.”100 
However, not five months earlier, George Kennan recommended to newly minted Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson to abandon the State Department’s “wait-and-see” policy. Kennan instead 
proposed a program of clandestine interference through “indigenous channels” designed to 
“discover, nourish and bring to power a new revolution” if the United States could not “in the 
meantime so modify the composition and character of the Chinese Communists that they become 
a truly independent government, existing in amicable relations with the world community."101 
Chinese students in the United States represented the “indigenous channels” that Kennan and 
others in the State Department sought to influence. 
                                                 
98 “Aid for Chinese Students,” New York Times (August 2, 1949), 12. 
99 Senate Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Aid Appropriation Act, 1950, 81st Cong., 1st sess., July 30, 1949, 
Report No. 812, 3. 
100 “Help for Chinese Students,” New York Times (July 4, 1949), 12. 
101 “United States Policy Toward China, February 25, 1949,” State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1949 
Vol. III (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983), 27-28. 
  49
The notion that the United States could indirectly influence socio-political developments 
in China was not new. Since the remission of the Boxer Indemnity Fund, American leaders had 
believed that the Chinese studying in the United States would become acquainted with American 
customs and ideals and this would influence them upon their return to China. However, the rapid 
spread of communism across Eastern Europe and Asia in the immediate postwar years 
precipitated a renewed emphasis on ideology since communism was considered directly 
antithetical to American values. As such, it was hoped, Chinese students who had lived in and 
experienced the American way of life would, upon their return to China, work as a pro-American 
cohort and combat the anti-American rhetoric of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as 
strengthen pro-American Chinese sentiment. These ideas were clearly written into the Judd bill, 
which was designed to “strengthen and encourage democratic forces in China.”102 
The Judd bill presupposed that returning Chinese students would continue to enjoy the 
“traditional position of scholar-leadership” upon their return to China. Therefore, assisting them 
during their time of need was in the United States’ best interest. Moreover, their close 
association and experience with the American “democratic way of life” would, in conjunction 
with the magnanimity of the American assistance programs, engender their favorable view of the 
United States.103 Unlike the $500,000 ECA fund allocation made in March, which was limited 
only to applicants in the scientific and technical fields, the Judd bill proposed to aid the 
approximate 4,000 Chinese students then studying in America, regardless of their field of study. 
Instead, the bill proposed that a student’s attitude toward democracy be taken under 
consideration as a qualification for receiving aid. Because the bill was intended to support 
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democracy in China, it was necessary that “stringent precautions be taken so that this program 
shall not be exploited by students not in sympathy with its broad purpose to strengthen and 
encourage the democratic way of life.”104 The proposal also maintained the qualification that 
Chinese students would agree to return to China after completion of their education. 
Written into the Foreign Aid Appropriations Act, 1950 (Public Law 327, 81st Congress), 
an allocation of $4,000,000 was made to the State Department to assist needy Chinese students 
in October 1949. Confident of the bill’s passage, many universities and colleges in the United 
States accepted Chinese students without requiring them to pay tuition and, once the allocation 
was made, applied for restitution under the new program. Once enacted, 2,164 new grantees 
were awarded financial aid under this program but, as with the earlier ECA fund allocation, the 
enormity of the Chinese problem was soon apparent. Though significantly larger than any 
previous assistance act, the $4,000,000 allocation was only enough to fund Chinese students 
through June 1950 before it was completely exhausted. This was in part due to the final collapse 
of the Nationalist Guomindang and the coalescence of Chinese Communist control over the 
mainland on October 1, 1949. The final collapse of the GMD isolated the Chinese students in the 
United States and cut off any remaining financial resources from the mainland that some Chinese 
students still had access to. The other drain on the allocation was due to the removal of the 
stipulation that aid could only be granted to those pursuing scientific or technical degrees. This 
greatly expanded the scope of the assistance program. Recognizing the immediacy of the 
problem, Representative Judd, on March 16, 1950, proposed allocating a further $6,000,000 to 
the State Department for continued assistance of Chinese students studying in the United States. 
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Due to the communist takeover of Mainland China, however, new stipulations on assistance 
grants were required. 
Judd’s March 16 proposal was written into Title II of the Foreign Economic Assistance 
Act of 1950, also known as the China Area Aid Act of 1950 (Public Law 535, 81st Congress), 
which was passed on June 5, 1950. Under Title II, the State Department, at the discretion of 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, was allocated $6,000,000: 
…to remain available until expended…for necessary expenses of tuition, subsistence, transportation, and 
emergency medical care…for study or teaching in accredited colleges, universities, or other educational 
institutions in the United States…or for research and related academic and technical activities in the United 
States, and the Attorney General is hereby authorized and directed to promulgate regulations providing that 
such selected citizens of China who have been admitted for purpose of study in the United States, shall be 
granted permission to accept employment upon application filed with the Commissioner of Immigration 
and Naturalization. 
 
Under Public Law 535, Chinese students were still required to sign a pledge to return to China 
upon termination of their studies, a formality that continued until January 1951, but were no 
longer required to do so. A drastic change from the qualifications placed on earlier assistance 
acts, Public Law 535 now permitted Chinese students to remain in the United States for a period 
of three years after completion of their studies, or failure to maintain full-time student status.  
Until China’s involvement in the Korean War, the State Department continued to fund any 
Chinese student who wanted to return to China but required assistance in securing passage. Yet, 
allowing Chinese students to remain in the United States for three months was not meant to 
garner them any special favors. Those who wished to remain in the United States indefinitely or 
apply for citizenship, were still required to qualify for visas and immigration status like any other 
foreign national. 
Public Law 535 also expanded the scope of assistance and offered financial aid to not 
only students, but researchers and other scholars as well. The previous financial allocations made 
to the State Department were designed to alleviate the financial burden on Chinese 
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undergraduate and graduate students but did not extend to professionals in teaching or research 
that were recent graduates and, therefore, unable to receive assistance. In widening the scope of 
the aid program it was anticipated that around four hundred individuals would qualify for 
assistance. That anticipation proved to be an overestimation and only 104 grants were actually 
given. Qualifications for this grant were high since it was aimed specifically at teachers, 
professors, or research scholars who were currently working at an established educational 
institution.105 
Finally, Public Law 535 allowed Chinese students and intellectuals in the United States to 
apply for, and accept, employment. Under the Immigration Act of 1924, which still dictated and 
extremely limited Chinese immigration and work eligibility, any Chinese student in the United 
States on a student visa was not allowed to accept any kind of work. This restriction placed a 
significant strain on Chinese students, whose financial remittances from China had ceased to 
come with the establishment of the People’s Republic and were more or less dependent on the 
American government for assistance. The decision to allow students to work prevented them 
from becoming a “relief problem” and allowed the State Department remittances to be treated as 
supplemental income rather than complete welfare.106 Though passed in June 1950, it would be 
another year before the Attorney General published regulations regarding a student’s ability to 
work.  
 
While the China Area Aid Act of 1950 did greatly expand the assistance program for 
Chinese students, it also created a host of other problems. Chinese students and professionals 
were still subject to restrictive and discriminatory immigration laws that prevented many from 
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accepting employment without first becoming a citizen. However, due to the Communist 
advance and subsequent victory in the Chinese Civil War, many were unable to return home and 
the State Department was dissuaded from forcing their return, since it would be considered 
inimical to not only the United States, but to the Chinese students themselves. After the 
Communist victory in China, Chinese students found themselves “neither quite legal aliens nor 
illegal ones.”107 
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CHAPTER 5 
SAVANTS OR SABOTEURS? 
THE CHINESE IN AMERICA DURING THE KOREAN WAR, 1949-53 
 
Passage of Public Law 535 coincided with the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 
June 1950. Though many facets of the aid program were designed to alleviate the plight of the 
Chinese students in the United States, growing anti-communist sentiment in 1950 led to a 
disjunction between various governmental agencies and their implementation of the law. The 
amendments to aid qualifications under Public Law 535 represented a drastic change from 
previous iterations of assistance and reflected the changing perception of the role of Chinese 
students. The Sino-Soviet alliance in February 1950 and the subsequent dismantling of Western 
institutions and influences in China led many to question the efficacy of returned Chinese 
students as “democratic forces.” Instead, they now represented sources of knowledge that needed 
to be retained in order to deny the Chinese Communist Party access to sensitive scientific and 
technical information. This situation was compounded by the North Korean invasion of South 
Korea and China’s vocal support for the war and anti-American rhetoric. Through the war years, 
the domestic experience of Chinese students in the United States was constantly dictated by anti-
communist paranoia and fear.  
 
Immediately preceding the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 
1949, a flurry of pro-Communist Chinese publications appeared in various cities across the 
United States. Aimed at a wide spectrum of Chinese living in America, these publications 
attempted to bring news and information about the Chinese Communist Party to potentially 
sympathetic Chinese. Newspaper publications, such as San Francisco’s China Weekly and New 
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York’s China Daily News, were easily identifiable with their pro-communist sentiments and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation took their formation and continued operation seriously.108 Less 
conspicuous, however, were the numerous Chinese student groups and organizations, several of 
which had been in operation for several decades prior to the Communist ascension to power in 
China. Despite their long-standing existence, these organizations engendered the suspicion of the 
FBI. Aware that many of these student groups formed as “reading groups,” which dedicated 
themselves to the study of Marxism-Leninism in order to prepare returning Chinese students by 
affiliating them with groups that were sympathetic to the Communist Party, federal agents 
closely monitored their activities. These groups existed at many of the major American 
universities that enrolled significant numbers of Chinese students such as Columbia University, 
New York University, the University of Chicago, and Harvard.109 Ji Chaozhu, who at this point 
was mere months away from returning to China, noted that in the reading groups at Harvard, 
discussion was “focused on Chairman Mao’s writings, which were just becoming widely 
available.” Moreover, conversation increasingly turned to how and when to return to China and 
what they would do upon their return.110  
The question of “what to do upon their return,” was of particular interest and concern to 
bureau agents who increasingly recognized the importance of Chinese students with scientific 
and technical training. Formed in Chicago in 1949, the Association of Chinese Scientific 
Workers in the United States was a 500-member group dedicated to cooperation with, and 
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advancement of, Chinese scientists and scientific work in China. Working in conjunction with a 
sister-organization within the People’s Republic, the group began, in March 1950, to advocate 
for its members and other Chinese scientists to return to China to assist in the scientific 
development of the PRC. The sister organization in Beijing was prepared to receive incoming 
American-trained scientists and scholars and had a detailed plan for where the returning scholars 
would best be utilized.111  
For the FBI, the troubling proliferation of pro-Chinese Communist groups in early 1950 
was exacerbated by the start of the Korean War and resulted in closer monitoring of Chinese 
students and scholars whose backgrounds indicated they may be sympathetic to the communist 
cause.112 Ji Chaozhu, while never intimating that he was under direct suspicion, did indicate that 
several members of his Chinese study group spoke plainly about being followed by government 
agents. Additionally, rumors began circulating amongst Chinese students that certain Chinese 
with backgrounds in scientific and technical fields were being interrogated about their political 
affiliations and, in some instances, detained by government officials.113 These rumors were not 
unfounded. 
Perhaps the most well known example of FBI intrusion began in June 1950, when two 
agents visited the office of Qian Xuesen at the Guggenheim Institute of the California Institute of 
Technology. Qian, who had recently delivered a well-publicized presentation on the feasibility of 
a transcontinental “rocketliner” in December 1949 and made predictions in Popular Mechanics 
in May 1950 about the possibility of landing a manned mission on the moon within thirty years, 
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was questioned about his affiliation with several suspected communists during the 1930s. 
Though he repudiated the charges and maintained that he was “philosophically opposed to the 
idea of Communism,” the American government, over the protests of his colleagues and 
university officials, stripped Qian of his security clearance.114 Denied the ability to work on 
sensitive research projects, Qian made the decision in mid-June to return to China but, after three 
months of preparations, was stopped by immigration authorities in September and barred from 
leaving the country. Qian’s experience denotes the beginning of the American government’s 
systematic retention of any Chinese with knowledge deemed prejudicial to American national 
security. It should be noted that this was before China’s entry into the Korean War. 
Concern over the political sympathies of Chinese students also dictated their access to 
financial aid allocations. Beginning in August 1950, students requesting extensions of stay or 
assistance as provided by Public Law 535, were subjected to investigation by Immigration and 
Naturalization authorities who demanded sworn statements to a series of seven or eight “very 
tough” questions. Opinions and statements were taken in regards to: 1.) their opinion of the 
Nationalist Government; 2.) their opinion of the Chinese Communist Party; 3.) which 
government would they choose; 4.) did they agree that the Communist Party of China should be 
seated at the United Nations; 5.) did they favor an overthrow of a government by force; 6.) 
whether or not they had ever been affiliated with a communist organization before coming to 
America; and, 7.) were they a communist or affiliated with a communist organization in the 
United States. Additionally, inquiries were made of several students regarding their affiliation 
with Chinese study groups that had suspected pro-communist sympathies. If a student failed to 
answer all questions successfully, or to the satisfaction of the investigating INS officer, they 
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were threatened with arrest and deportation to Taiwan, where they would be subject to Chiang 
Kai-shek’s methods of “dealing” with communists.115 
The intense scrutiny under which Chinese students and scholars found themselves in mid-
1950 was not simply an exigency of the Korean War, but was reflective of broader political 
trends at the time. Senator Joseph McCarthy and his anti-communist witch-hunt, which, 
according to Dr. John King Fairbank, was worth “ten divisions to the Chinese Communists and 
many more to the Soviet Union,” embroiled the Chinese students in the United States in a 
political struggle that many cared nothing about.116 Moreover, the overt politicization of the 
Chinese student issue, especially in the case of Qian Xuesen, served only to foster anti-American 
sentiment among the Chinese by suspecting them of being Communist agents and sympathizers. 
It also served as perfect fodder for Chinese Communist propaganda. In April 1950, the 
Communist Party published an open letter, ostensibly written by Hua Luogeng, former Professor 
of Mathematics at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, which denounced the United 
States for its restrictive immigration policies and systemic patterns of injustice toward the 
Chinese people. Additionally, it was claimed that the United States was detaining China’s 
“extraordinary individuals” for their own purposes and that “Chinese students, scientists, and 
technical experts residing in America” should “follow his example and return to the side of 
brightness, the side where the interests of the majority lie.”117  
Despite the protestations of some like Dr. Fairbank and the propaganda value provided by 
the politicizing of Chinese students and scholars, Congress passed in September the Internal 
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Security Act of 1950. Harshly punitive and hysterically anti-Communist, the act allowed for the 
detention and deportation of any alien found harboring pro-Communist sympathies. Though 
never used outright, the Internal Security Act strengthened the powers of the Attorney General 
and highlighted the paranoid and suspicious nature of the early 1950s. Furthermore, and more 
important to Chinese students and scholars, many tenets of the Internal Security Act were later 
written into the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which, when enacted, served as the legal basis for 
the forced retention and disallowance of many Chinese students and scholars to return to China.  
Fearing continued degradation of the political climate in the United States would prevent 
their ability to return to China, many Chinese students who had the ability, such as Ji Chaozhu, 
made travel arrangements to return before they were considered “too valuable to hand over to 
Red China…”118 Value, however, was primarily considered for students whose degrees were 
conferred in the fields of science and technology and whose departure could be construed as 
inimical to American national security. This justification was utilized when American officials 
boarded the SS President Wilson on September 14 in Yokohama, Japan and removed four 
Chinese students. The two men and two women removed were claimed to have connections with 
Qian Xuesen and, therefore, were not eligible to return to China. The remaining 115 Chinese 
students on board the vessel were left unmolested and continued to their journey to Hong Kong, 
where all but seven eventually returned to Mainland China.119 This case, however, remained the 
exception. According to the State Department, which continued to provide monetary assistance 
to Chinese students who wished to leave the United States but were too financially destitute to do 
so of their own accord, an estimated 633 students (roughly 80% who received State Department 
assistance) left for China by mid-1950, before the People’s Republic of China entered the 
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Korean War.120 It was not until after the People’s Republic entered the war that Chinese students, 
especially those with scientific or technical knowledge, were denied the ability to leave the 
United States. 
China’s entrance into the Korean War on October 1, 1950 brought new considerations to 
the Chinese residing in the United States. Where before, the State Department claimed, it helped 
finance the return of any Chinese student who wished to go back to China, once Chinese 
Volunteers entered the war, the State Department was instructed to prevent the departure of those 
whose technical qualifications were considered antithetical to American national security.121 
Operating under this new edict, the State Department, in early November, received information 
that a large number of Chinese students were attempting to return to China on board a Canadian 
Pacific Airlines flight bound for Hong Kong. Claiming that leaders of the organization that had 
made the travel arrangements were closely associated with communist entities, the State 
Department blocked the flight and denied exit to the Chinese students on board.122  
The State Department’s interdiction on technically and scientifically trained Chinese 
students leaving was soon muddled by the Department of Justice and INS authorities. Operating 
under the new Internal Security Act, which demanded the deportation of any alien with 
communist associations, INS officials were prepared to deport any Chinese student with 
communist ties. For many qualified Chinese students and scholars, such as Qian Xuesen, this led 
to a complicated and confusing situation where they were served deportation orders by the INS 
but were denied exit by the State Department. The disjunction between the two departments led 
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to an uneven implementation of the law but did manage to effectively deny exit to nearly all the 
Chinese students remaining in the United States.  
The confusion between the two departments was soon rectified on December 16, 1950, 
when President Truman declared a state of emergency in the United States due to the expansion 
of “communist imperialism” (Presidential Proclamation No. 2914). As a result, the detention of 
Chinese students and scholars became a direct exigency of the war since their return to the 
People’s Republic of China would be directly benefitting a war enemy of the United States. 
Further clarification of this policy was made in November 1951, when a wartime law of 1917, 
designed to prevent “seepage into enemy territory” of information or knowledge considered 
pernicious to American security, was reinterpreted to apply to the Chinese student situation. 
However, by December 1950, Chinese students were effectively barred from leaving the country 
and left stranded in the United States.123 
Growing anti-Communist hysteria in 1950 embroiled Chinese students in American 
domestic politics, not as actors but as pieces. Reminiscent of the anti-Chinese hysteria that 
gripped the United States in the 1870s and 1880s, INS and the Department of Justice, enabled by 
the Internal Security Act of 1950, targeted Chinese students as potential subversives. 
Furthermore, it was not only high profile Chinese students and scholars, such as Qian Xuesen, 
who were targeted by anti-communist crusaders. Unable to find legal employment without first 
reporting to a local INS office, Chinese students had to endure relentless questioning of their 
political loyalty, beliefs, and their motivations for remaining in the United States. This was the 
case with Rosaline Bien, a student at Columbia University in New York, who, on March 5, 1951, 
went to the New York branch of the INS to apply for an extension of stay. In her hearing she was 
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asked about her attitude toward the Chinese Communist regime. Bien stated that she had come to 
the United States in 1947 and remained in school for the past four years. Though she had heard 
both positive and negative things about the Communist Party of China, she felt she could not 
take a definite stance since she had never experienced firsthand the way the regime functioned. 
This statement quickly turned the hearing into an interrogation. The inspector urged Bien to take 
a definite stand because her prior comment intimated that she held pro-Communist sympathies. 
Without taking a definite stand, threatened the inspector, Bien could be subject to an FBI 
inspection, which had the potential for her to be dragged out of her house in the middle of the 
night and incarcerated at Ellis Island for her pro-Communist attitude. Moreover, if she were 
found to harbor pro-Communist sentiment, she would not be sent to Mainland China, she would 
instead be sent to Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang had become quite adept 
at “dealing” with communists. Bien again reaffirmed that she had no opinion either way of the 
Chinese government and, after receiving several more threats, was released from the 
interrogation and allowed to continue with her studies.124 
Other students were not so lucky. Kao Lin-ying, a fellow student of Bien’s at Columbia 
University, was also forced to appear before an INS hearing. Kao, “who by no stretch of the 
imagination could be suspected of being a communist or security risk,” according to the foreign 
student advisor at Columbia, Dr. Clarence Linton, was issued a Warrant for Arrest and ordered to 
report to the New York INS branch in writing every month. Allowed to continue with her 
studies, Kao was released on parole and told that when INS wanted her, they would come arrest 
her.125  
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Threats of deportation and arrest were not the only problem that Chinese students faced 
in 1951 due to suspicion of their political affiliation. Many who remained in the United States 
after 1950 did so because they were still on scholarships or financial assistance from the State 
Department, without which they would not have been able to afford tuition and living expenses. 
The predication of financial aid allocations on an individual’s political disposition, which began 
around mid-1950, caused many to suddenly have their grants terminated by the State 
Department. This was especially perturbing to Dr. Clarence Clinton who, in a letter written to 
Dr. Ernest G. Osborne for transmittal to the White House, named four students at Columbia 
University and three from New York University, who were in good academic standing but had 
been dropped from government assistance for “administrative reasons.”126 Furthermore, Linton 
stated that these cases were not unique to Columbia University or New York University and 
were occurring at other colleges as well. Linton’s concern was that, in their application of the 
Internal Security Act of 1950, the Department of Justice was “defeating in a ratio of about 10 to 
1 every constructive international understanding of the Department of State.”127 
New York was not the only city adopting these polices. The FBI, which was already 
concerned over the potential infiltration of Chinese student groups by communists, arrested 
eleven Chinese students at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in early 1951. Led from 
campus in handcuffs, the students were transported to Chicago where they were incarcerated at 
an INS detention facility. The reason given was that these students belonged to the Chinese 
Student Christian Association (CSCA). The CSCA was one of the first Chinese student groups in 
the United States and, since its incorporation by the YMCA in 1909, was ran under their 
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auspices. The FBI began monitoring CSCA activities in late 1949 and received “reliable 
information” that the organization had disseminated pro-communist literature to members and, in 
1950-51, was emphasizing the need for members to return to China to aid the new regime.128 The 
students were later remanded to the “technical custody” of University of Illinois officials who 
were deeply concerned over the arrest and threats of deportation made to Chinese students.129 
Through early 1951, educators with a close association to Chinese students remained the 
only ones who were concerned with their plight. Outside of academia and the requisite 
governmental agencies dealing with Chinese students, most Americans remained ignorant of the 
challenges they faced. After hearing about the discriminatory and prejudicial treatment of 
Chinese students, particularly those in Chicago, James Reston wrote an article for the New York 
Times in March 1951 that opened the case to the American public. In Reston’s estimation, there 
were roughly 3,600 Chinese students in the United States, most of whom were doing graduate 
work at a smattering of large universities across the country, who were encountering “obsolete 
and harsh” policies from the regional offices of the INS. This was a result of two primary causes. 
First, which has already been discussed, was the involvement of some in student groups, such as 
the CSCA and the Scientific Workers Association of Engineering and Chemistry, which had 
been infiltrated at the top by pro-communist sympathizers. This led to an overly simple 
governmental policy of branding them all as subversives and attempting to deport them. 
However, Reston’s second and more scathing critique, was the failure of the Executive Branch to 
promulgate the provisions made in Public Law 535 that would allow Chinese students to legally 
accept employment in the United States after their graduation. Due to the Attorney General’s 
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failure to do so, many Chinese students were unable to find legal employment after graduating 
and were living illegally in the United States. Moreover, those who were forced to withdraw 
from classes due to financial constraints were also no longer legally able to remain in the United 
States since they were on student visas that required them to remain enrolled in a university or 
college program and prohibited them from working. The problem was compounded by the 
confused policies between the Justice Department and the Department of State. Since many were 
living illegally in the United States on student visas, and because in order to be granted an 
extension of stay, most Chinese students had to report to the regional offices of the INS, which, 
operating under the provisions of the Internal Security Act, served them with warrants of 
deportation, whether they wished to go or not. The State Department, however, maintained that 
no student wishing to remain in the United States would be deported. As a result, once a Chinese 
student graduated or left school, they could not find legal employment and thus were subject to 
harassment by the INS.130 
Reston’s article engendered the ire of the Departments of State and Justice, both of whom 
agreed that information regarding the detention of Chinese students should not be made 
public.131 Regardless, it was well timed and coincided with the Foreign Students Advisor 
Association (FSAA) meeting in Denver, Colorado on April 11. The intent of the meeting was to 
resolve the issues surrounding the treatment of Chinese students by INS authorities.132 The 
Department of Justice appointed Allen C. Devaney, Assistant Commissioner of Immigration, to 
represent both the Department of Justice and INS at the meeting. Over the course of a few days, 
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he and Dr. Clarence Linton, along with representatives from universities across the country and 
from the Department of State, worked to develop a comprehensive plan to mitigate the situation 
Chinese students were facing. Writing to John R. Steelman, Assistant to the President, on April 
17, Dr. Linton reported that the FSAA recommended to the Departments of State and Justice that 
they make provisions for “(1) consultation with foreign student advisers or other appropriate 
officials of educational institutions before decisions are made on extensions of stay in the United 
States and/or termination of grants; and (2) a review by a competent body at the Washington 
level, on request of the educational institution concerned.”133 It was believed that these two 
provisions would mitigate the prejudicial treatment Chinese students faced and that those whose 
grants had been terminated may be reinstated in order to conclude their studies. Moreover, these 
measures would help provide a uniform pattern of treatment and remove the arbitrary application 
of the law that was being enforced at the local level.  
The combination of the Reston article exposing the prejudicial treatment of Chinese 
students and the recommendation of the FSAA pushed United States Attorney General J. 
Howard McGrath to quickly promulgate the regulations made under Public Law 535. On April 
13, 1951, almost a full year after Congress had approved the act, Chinese students were allowed 
to legally accept employment. In the promulgation, McGrath stipulated that Chinese students 
may remain indefinitely but were required to report to their regional branch or District Director 
of Immigration and Naturalization Service every three months regarding their whereabouts and 
nature of their employment.134 Though Chinese students were now allowed to accept 
employment, either while they were still enrolled in school or after graduation, many still found 
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it difficult to find employment in their chosen fields. China’s participation in the Korean War 
meant they were considered potential security risks. Because of this, many Chinese with 
engineering degrees were barred from employment at large engineering firms.135 Others, such as 
those in the medical fields or education, were also barred from accepting employment because 
they were not citizens of the United States.136 Overall, however, Chinese students with 
backgrounds in engineering, the sciences, or medicine found it much easier to find employment 
than their peers with degrees in the humanities. In May 1952, Chih Meng, Director of the China 
Institute in America, released a statement that revealed the enormity of the problem. In it, Meng 
claimed that recent graduates with master’s degrees and Ph.D’s in English, philosophy, and 
economics were washing dishes in restaurants, working in laundries, or “peddling chop suey 
wholesale.”137 This was corroborated by a State Department study, which found that nearly 94 
percent of students with technical degrees were employed within their own fields, whereas only 
57 percent of students with non-technical degrees had found satisfactory employment within 
their specialization.138 For those who were able to find employment, problems soon arose over 
mobility, appropriate compensation, and prejudice within the workplace. 
Many of the students who came to the United States to study came from privileged 
classes in China. The cost of study abroad was inherently discriminatory toward those without 
the financial ability to send a son or daughter abroad and support them while they were away. As 
a result, many had pretensions of class and found their substandard existence humiliating.139 
Additionally, many who came to the United States were already well accomplished in their own 
                                                 
135 Kung, 81. 
136 Kung, 81-82. 
137 Benjamine Fine, “6,000 Students Stranded, Stranded in US, Resist Red Lures to Return to China,” New York 
Times (May 11, 1952), 1. 
138 Kung, 86. 
139 Rose Hum Lee, “The Stranded Chinese in the United States,” The Phylon Quarterly 19, no. 2 (2nd Quarter, 1958), 
188-189. 
  68
right. Beginning in 1943 the United States government and the Guomindang made specific 
overtures to recruit well-qualified Chinese government officials to receive advanced training in 
the United States. Ranking officials in the Guomindang Party, such as the Secretary of the 
Kwangtung Provincial Branch, members of the Agricultural Research Institute of the Executive 
Yuan, and Commissioner of Education in Anhwei Province, were some of the early recipients of 
this exchange program.140 This policy continued through the Second World War and lasted until 
the collapse of the Guomindang Party in 1949, which left a significant number of highly trained 
and formerly powerful individuals stranded in the United States. The reduction in status and 
discrimination these individuals faced constituted a significant degradation of morale. These 
factors were exacerbated by the restrictive immigration policies that Chinese had to navigate in 
the United States and the systemic racism they encountered. Many individuals reported that it 
was not uncommon to be passed over for promotion in favor of less educated, less experienced, 
and less qualified white subordinates. As a result, many felt they had jobs but not careers and the 
possibility for upward mobility within a company or corporation was nonexistent.141 
Though pretensions of class and systemic racism were certainly major factors delimiting 
the Chinese experience in the United States, one of the toughest obstacles that Chinese students 
and scholars faced was the outdated and prejudicial immigration laws enforced against Asian 
immigrants. The United States, well into 1965, continued to operate under the 1924 National 
Origins Act, which heavily favored immigration from Europe and more or less denied 
immigrants legal citizenship from any Asian nation.142 In mid-1952, however, the National 
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Origins Act was slightly amended by the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act (Public Law 414). 
Proposed by Senator Pat McCarran from Nevada and Senator Francis E. Walter from 
Pennsylvania, the act originally passed in Congress in late May 1952, but was quickly vetoed by 
President Truman, who declared it “nothing in the world but approval of all the mistakes the 
State and Justice [Departments] have made in the last ten years of the administration of the 
immigration laws.”143 Despite Truman’s veto, the act was passed in Congress on June 27 and 
went into effect on December 24. It severely affected Chinese students in two major ways – 1.) 
By ostensibly allowing Chinese immigrants to apply for citizenship under a quota system, and, 
2.) By legally codifying the forced arrest, detention, and deportation of any alien suspected of 
having communist associations. 
Well-qualified Chinese residing in the United States sought employment in their 
respective fields. For those with technical degrees, jobs were more easily obtained, as has been 
shown. However, many with degrees in the humanities, the fine arts, and even medicine 
remained unable to find suitable employment within their fields. Seeking jobs in public 
education, state universities, civil service, and private corporations (many of which worked on 
government contracts), remained a struggle since most were considered nonimmigrant aliens, 
unable to apply for citizenship, and, therefore, disqualified from accepting employment in their 
fields, which required citizenship or an active application toward citizenship. Additionally, those 
who needed a license to practice, such as doctors, dentists, and lawyers, were similarly 
disqualified since the same prerequisites on citizenship were enforced in the procurement of 
licenses.144 The McCarran-Walter Act ostensibly alleviated this problem by placing Chinese 
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immigrants on the same quota system that applied to immigrants from Europe and the Western 
Hemisphere. Yet, quotas for Asian immigration were still prohibitively prescribed and, under the 
provisions of section 201 and 202 of the act, set at 1/6th of 1 percent of the total Chinese 
immigrant population in the United States in 1920.145 This resulted in a paltry minimum of 100 
Chinese immigrants per year, effectively upholding the tenets of the 1924 National Origins Act 
and making the provisions of immigration symbolic rather than practical.146 
While the placement of Chinese immigration on the quota system was largely ineffectual, 
and morally repugnant to many of its critics,147 the true purpose of the act was to severely curtail 
the expansion of Communism by limiting the ability of immigrants with pro-Communist 
sympathies to come to the United States. Any person who was deemed by an immigration 
inspector or official to have any affiliation with Communism, whether in the United States or 
abroad, was denied permission to enter the country. Already suspicious of the Chinese students 
and scholars residing in the United States, this policy further hindered the ability of many 
potential Chinese immigrants to apply for citizenship. Furthermore, the act also denied 
citizenship for anyone who, in the opinion of immigration officials, was likely to become, at any 
time, a public charge or ward of the state. This again had the effect of limiting Chinese students’ 
ability to apply for citizenship since many were already recipients of federal assistance and, 
effectively, were public charges.148 
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Section 215 of the McCarran-Walter Act was most damning for Chinese students but 
brought little change to their current situation. Rather, section 215 reinforced and legally codified 
the forced detention and retention of Chinese students and scholars by stating: 
When the United States is at war or during the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the 
President, or, as to aliens, whenever there exists a state of war between or among two or more states, and 
the President shall find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions in 
addition to those provided otherwise than by this section be imposed upon the departure of persons from 
and their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclamation thereof, it shall, until otherwise 
ordered by the President or the Congress, be unlawful149 
 
Moreover, the law denied the ability for any individual, under the above provision, to depart or 
attempt to depart from the United States without approval of the government. Those who were 
found to be in violation of this act could be fined $5,000 or imprisoned and anyone attempting to 
assist in the departure from the United States of a person deemed ineligible to leave, was subject 
to the same provisions of incarceration and monetary fines, as well as forfeiture of their vehicle 
or vessel to the United States.150 Therefore, section 215 of the McCarran-Walter Act legally 
reinforced the detention of any Chinese student or scholar who wished to leave the country and 
was supported by President Truman’s Presidential Proclamation of December 16, 1950, which 
had declared a state of emergency due to the war in Korea with China. 
President Truman was not the only critic of the act. Four days after the act went into 
effect, on December 28, 1952, Senator Herbert H. Lehman, New York Democrat and vocal 
opponent of Senator Joseph McCarthy, delivered a scathing assessment of the McCarran-Walter 
Act at the annual meeting of the Jewish War Veterans. Lehman remarked that the act “directly 
and cruelly denies all that America is and stands for. That act bristles with hostility against the 
alien and foreign-born. It is a law conceived in suspicion and brought forth in fear…the 
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underlying assumption of the McCarran-Walter Act is that every alien is a potential saboteur and 
criminal, and every potential immigrant must remain so branded unless and until he can prove 
otherwise…If he is foreign-born, the McCarran-Walter Act regards him as suspect until he 
dies.”151  
The promulgation of Section 215 of the McCarran-Walter Act was further codified and 
reinforced on January 17, 1953, when President Truman delivered Presidential Proclamation 
3004. One of his final acts in office, the proclamation reaffirmed the existence of the state of 
emergency as declared in his Proclamation of 1950 and restricted immigration into and out of the 
United States without a valid passport. Though unpopular, and steeped in anti-communist 
paranoia, the conjunction of the McCarran-Walter Act and Truman’s Presidential Proclamation 
served as the legal basis for which Chinese students and scholars were subject to arrest and 
detention in the United States. It also legally prevented Chinese students from departing the 
United States and allowed for the legal incarceration of those who wished to leave.152 Yet, these 
post hoc legalities proved to be mere formalities and simply reaffirmed the policies and 
procedures instituted by the State Department and Justice Department (i.e. INS) beginning in 
late-1950.  
Under the legal provisions provided by the McCarran-Walter Act and Truman’s 
Presidential Proclamation, the Departments of State and Justice continued to detain any Chinese 
whose technical or scientific knowledge were deemed prejudicial to American national security 
or would provide much needed sources of information to the Chinese Communist Party. Qian 
Xuesen, already placed on trial to defend himself against allegations of supposed pro-Communist 
sympathies in 1952, was, under these provisions, again told he was not allowed to leave the 
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country and had his deportation order stayed.153 Yet, high profile scholars such as Qian were not 
the only ones denied permission to leave the United States. Dr. Liang Mun Wang, physician at 
Shore Memorial Hospital in Somers Point, New Jersey, indicated to Immigration authorities in 
early 1954 that he desired to return to China in order to get his wife and daughter out of the PRC. 
In March 1954, his request to leave the country was denied by INS officials on the basis that his 
knowledge and training, should he fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists, would be 
contrary to American security interests. Dr. Liang Mun Wang, it was reported, was only one of 
several physicians and scientists denied permission to depart from the United States in March.154 
This policy of detaining technically and scientifically trained Chinese students and scholars 
continued well into 1955, when the United States and the People’s Republic of China finally 
reached an agreement on the exchange of individuals detained in each country at Geneva.  
Through 1953 Chinese students and scholars had limited options in regards to their 
situation. Those who wished to return to Mainland China found their exit blocked by the State 
Department for fear that they would return to the People’s Republic and assist the Communists. 
Conversely, those who wished to stay in the United States also had few options open to them 
since the McCarran-Walter Act so limited their ability to legally apply for citizenship. Many 
were unable to find suitable employment because they were either considered security risks or 
because the jobs they were seeking required American citizenship or proof that they were 
working toward that goal. Others, especially those with degrees in the humanities, encountered a 
drought of available positions. In his 1955 study of Chinese students and former students in New 
York, Samuel S. Kung noted one individual who received a Ph.D. from Columbia University in 
May 1953 in International Affairs with a specialization in Oriental History who had sent 
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applications to over 200 small universities and colleges and had received no word from any of 
them. Instead, this individual found the only source of employment available to them was 
working as a desk clerk at the university library.155 For many Chinese students who were recent 
graduates and unable to find employment, this forced them to report to their regional division of 
INS every three months and subject themselves to intrusive questions and investigations since 
they were technically living in the United States illegally on expired visas. As a result, and due to 
continued funding through the State Department, numerous Chinese students simply decided to 
remain in school and pursue a second or third degree.156  
Others were more fortunate and found local benefactors to represent their cases to INS 
officials. Dr. Liu Hsi-yen, Professor of Pediatrics and Communicable Diseases at the University 
of Michigan Medical School, was one such recipient. Dr. Liu came to the United States in 1940 
and studied at Morningside College in Sioux City, Iowa before going to medical school at the 
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. Dr. Liu graduated from medical school in 1948 and took 
an internship at Harper Hospital in Detroit before applying for permanent residency in 1949. Due 
to extenuating circumstances, it took her several years to acquire the requisite paperwork, which 
was voided after the passing of the McCarran-Walter Act, resulting in INS ordering her to be 
deported in March 1953. Believing her case to be “exceptionally meritorious,” Michigan 
Representative George Meader introduced a private bill into Congress on her behalf to have her 
deportation stayed.157 Dr. Pak Chue-chan was another who greatly benefitted from community 
support. Dr. Pak studied medicine in the United States between 1919 and 1923, first at Emory 
College in Atlanta, Georgia and then at George Washington University in Washington, DC. He 
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spent almost the next thirty years practicing medicine in China before fleeing from the 
communists in 1949, and then two more years in Hong Kong. Dr. Pak came back to the United 
States in 1953 and accepted two jobs at Iowa State College (now Iowa State University), one as 
physician at Iowa State College Hospital and the other as Professor of Hygiene. However, due to 
his inability to practice medicine legally in the United States, Immigration authorities threatened 
him with deportation in mid-1953. Local church and community leaders successfully rallied on 
his behalf and wrote to INS to stay his deportation.158  
Finally, some Chinese students also benefitted from a flurry of private assistance 
programs in early to mid-1953 that allowed them to remain in school. In late March, Chinese 
students at Cornell University were recipients of a private fund, originally established to assist 
Chinese students at Nankai University in Tianjin, which was repurposed to assist them by 
defraying their university costs and keeping them enrolled in the university.159 The China 
Institute in America enacted a similar assistance program in July, which financed nine 
fellowships for top performing Chinese students in the United States. Yet, like the earlier aid 
programs in 1948 and 1949, three of the fellowships were for students studying medicine, public 
health, or engineering, and the remaining six were for students studying the natural sciences. 
Again, no provisions were made for those studying in the humanities or fine arts. Though these 
aid programs were able to assist a small percentage of Chinese students, Chih Meng, director of 
the China Institute, declared that in order to assist all the Chinese living in the United States, 
nearly $5,000,000 would be needed in order to help students complete their studies over the 
following three years.160 Restriction, restitution, subsistence survival; these were the realities that 
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Chinese students faced through 1953 living in the United States. These realities were soon 
ameliorated, to an extent, when President Eisenhower signed the Refugee Relief Act (Public Law 
203) into law on August 7, 1953.  
The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 amended the prejudicial McCarran-Walter Act by 
allowing refugees to immigrate to the United States as non-quota immigrants, thereby 
circumnavigating the prejudicial limits enforced in the 1952 act. For the Chinese, an allotment of 
2,000 immigrants was made for those possessing visas endorsed by the Guomindang, which 
most of the stranded Chinese in the United States held. Further, the act granted an adjustment of 
status to any Chinese who: 
Establishe[d] that prior to July 1, 1953, he lawfully entered the United States as a bona fide nonimmigrant 
and that because of events which have occurred subsequent to his entry into the United States he is unable 
to return to the country of his birth, or nationality, or last residence, because of persecution or fear of 
persecution…may, within one year after the effective date of this Act, apply to the Attorney General of the 
United States for an adjustment of his immigration status.161 
 
If the Attorney General, Herbert Brownell Jr., found that the applicant was “of good moral 
character,” physically present in the United States at the time the law was enacted, and 
“otherwise qualified under all other provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act” but was 
disqualified because the quota for their country was already oversubscribed, then he was 
permitted to present their case before Congress in order to have their immigration status 
amended to allow for their legal residence within the United States. Those whose cases were not 
approved by Congress, or who failed to apply before the August 1954 deadline, would be 
deported in accordance with the law.162  
Though the law was conceived with a humanitarian goal in mind, several conceptions 
written into the McCarran-Walter Act found their way into the Refugee Relief Act. Assurances 
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from immigrants had to be made that they would find suitable employment, without displacing 
those currently employed, and the immigrant would not become a public charge.163 Additionally, 
the provisions of section 212 of the McCarran-Walter Act were upheld, which required screening 
to ensure that no one with pro-Communist sympathies was admitted into the United States.164 
These provisions drew pointed criticism from New York Representative Emanuel Celler, who 
claimed that, in administration of the law, it had been “prostituted” and turned into a “dismal 
failure,” since potential immigrants and refugees had to “surmount an obstacle race of reports 
and investigations by a…bureaucracy run riot in a mystic maze of enforcement.”165 Eisenhower 
too had his doubts on the efficacy of the act due to the limiting provisions and proposed 
Congress further amend it in May 1955.166 Regardless, for the Chinese students and scholars 
residing in the United States, promulgation of the Refugee Relief Act finally allowed many to 
apply for an amendment to their immigration status and accept legal residence. However, in 
Yelong Han’s estimation, while “one need not be reticent about the humane spirit of the act,” it 
did essentially force those remaining in the United States to apply for citizenship by removing 
their freedom not to. Any Chinese who did not apply would be subject to deportation. Yet, 
lacking diplomatic relations between the United States and People’s Republic of China, and the 
State Department’s interdiction on allowing scientifically and technically trained individuals to 
depart for China, those who did not would continue to remain in the same precarious position 
they currently occupied and endure the hardships therein conferred by nature of their 
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nonimmigrant status. Therefore, “applying for permanent resident status in America seemed the 
only choice for those who were unlikely to be granted an exit permit.”167 
 
It remains an intransigent fact that the forced detention of Chinese students was never 
widely known among the general American population. A smattering of news articles covered 
some instances but most remained brief, if covered at all. Perhaps the most sensational was the 
high profile case of Qian Xuesen, who was arrested and placed on trial shortly after making 
several well received postulations about transcontinental rocket travel and landing manned 
missions on the moon. For the majority of Chinese students and scholars though, little attention, 
outside of academic circles, was given to their plight. For most Americans, the Chinese in Korea 
were far more important than the Chinese living in the United States. Moreover, the 
sensationalism and paranoia of American politics in the early 1950s, combined with China’s 
entrance into the Korean War, served to relegate Chinese students to second-class status and, for 
those possessing advanced degrees and technical knowledge, label them as potential enemy 
agents and security risks. During the Korean War, the Chinese experience in the United States 
was, at best marginal, and at worst frustrating and humiliating. Those who wished to remain in 
the United States found their options severely limited by restrictive legislation, so too did those 
who wished to return to China. Between 1950 and 1953, Chinese students and scholars in the 
United States had little choice but to attempt to navigate, as best they could, the prescriptive 
confines of a prejudicial American society.  
Despite attempts to enforce a standard, institutionalized policy towards Chinese students 
and scholars, the Departments of State and Justice remained at odds with one another over their 
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treatment, with the Department of Justice and INS consistently serving orders of deportation 
while the State Department adamantly refused exit to any Chinese with knowledge deemed 
inimical to American security.  
The end of the Korean War and changing of Presidential administrations brought a 
modicum of fair treatment to Chinese students and scholars with the passage of the Refugee 
Relief Act in 1953. Though limiting in its own way, the act did finally allow the Chinese 
stranded in the United States to apply for permanent residence and, to a degree, alleviated their 
situation in regards to employment and quarterly check-ins with the INS. Not wanting these 
individuals to become “public charges,” which many already were, the Refugee Relief Act 
allowed for them to apply for citizenship and eased the burden many encountered in attempting 
to find legal employment within their fields. Introduced as humanitarian legislation, the financial 
and administrative burdens of maintaining the large cohort of stateless Chinese students provided 
more legislative and bureaucratic inertia than the humanitarian spirit behind the act. 
While their domestic situation began to ameliorate in 1953, Chinese students soon 
became embroiled in the larger international Cold War conflict between the United States and 
People’s Republic of China when the two countries sat down at Geneva to discuss a de-
escalation of tensions in the Far East. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
FACE-TO-FACE: THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 
AND THE CHINESE STUDENT ISSUE, 1949-55 
 
 
The stranded Chinese in the United States navigated a series of discriminatory and 
prejudicial laws during the early 1950s. Though once seen as potential pro-American democratic 
forces, with the United States devoting roughly $10,500,000 in financial assistance allocations to 
help these students and scholars remain in school and complete their university educations 
through 1955, their treatment changed drastically once Chinese volunteers entered the Korean 
War. The Department of Justice and Immigration and Naturalization Service, operating under the 
reactionary and suspicious interdictions authorized by the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the 
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, harassed as potential subversives and served orders of 
deportation to many Chinese students. Conversely, the Department of State, recognizing the 
potentiality that scientifically and technically trained Chinese students and scholars would return 
to the People’s Republic of China and provide them much needed assistance, refused deportation 
orders and disallowed the exit from the United States of any Chinese student or scholar. Between 
1950 and 1955, Chinese students and scholars were effectively stranded in the United States. 
Disallowed from leaving the country, and, until mid-1953, unable to apply for permanent 
residence in the United States, many endured a semi-legal subsistence existence as public wards. 
For the American government, Chinese students and scholars residing in the country needed to 
be retained in order to deny the People’s Republic access to advanced scientific and technical 
knowledge that might help them modernize and (according to American officials at the time) 
challenge American national security at home and abroad. 
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While the United States attempted to keep this information secret from the American public, 
and certainly from their Cold War enemies, it did not take long before the Chinese Communist 
Party discovered these policies and utilized them in anti-American propaganda campaigns. In 
1951 the domestic issue of retaining Chinese students and scholars became an international affair 
and politicized the Chinese student issue as an exigency of the broader Sino-American Cold War 
conflict. Through pro-communist Chinese newspapers and magazines disseminated in the United 
States and Voice of America broadcasts aimed at China, both countries attempted to influence 
Chinese students at home and abroad. The early Cold War conflict over Chinese students was 
mostly limited to these types of propaganda campaigns. However, by 1954, following the 
conclusion of the Korean War, the Chinese student issue developed into an international issue, 
resulting in a series of face-to-face meetings between American and Chinese representatives in 
Geneva, Switzerland.  
 
Chinese students in the United States were acutely attuned to the political developments in 
China. Numerous Chinese-language publications kept Chinese students apprised of the 
Communist Party’s growing strength and military gains by the People’s Liberation Army in the 
late 1940s. Dissidents and pro-Communist Chinese living in the United States disseminated 
propaganda through publications such as China Weekly and the China Tribune. Moreover, 
Communist infiltration of Chinese student organizations, like the Chinese Student Christian 
Association (CSCA) and the Association of Chinese Scientific Workers in America, spread pro-
Communist messages to members in an attempt to compel them to return to China. Though not 
officially endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party, these efforts nonetheless proved effective 
in aligning with the CCP’s attempts to reach out to students and scholars living in the United 
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States.168 In August 1949 the Committee for Higher Education in North China called for Chinese 
students studying overseas to “return to the homeland at the completion of their studies to serve 
the new and glorious fatherland” and established the Committee for Returned Student’s Affairs 
to welcome them and put them to work in China’s industries. Many, however, first needed to 
attend the People’s University for political education before they could be employed.169 
Domestically, the CCP trumpeted the return of overseas Chinese as a great success and 
lambasted the United States for attempting to block their return. The search and seizure of four 
returning Chinese students in Yokohama, Japan toward the end of November 1950 proved 
especially useful, since among that cohort was high profile scholar Zhao Zhongyao (Chao 
Chung-yao), nuclear physicist at the California Institute of Technology. Chinese newspapers 
excoriated the United States for their “brutal seizure” and “illegal detention” of the scientists, as 
well as the retention of their personal belongings after they were remanded from American 
custody and allowed to return to China.170 Chinese newspapers followed Zhao’s return closely as 
he and his fellow returned Chinese cabled Chairman Mao to “pay…highest respects…” and 
“pledge[d] to stand…at our post and do our utmost for revolutionary reconstruction.”171 Zhao’s 
participation in an anti-imperialist meeting in Shanghai on December 8, 1950 was similarly 
covered, as he and other returned Chinese students attacked America’s participation in the 
Korean War and policies of detaining Chinese students.172 
High profile scholars, however, were not the only returned Chinese students utilized as 
propaganda. In many instances articles and “open letters” were simply published under the name 
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of an average returned student. This list of grievances against the United States varied but all 
castigated American policies and treatment of Chinese students. In some instances, the crimes 
were simply arbitrary, such as FBI interdictions on Chinese students being allowed to check out 
books from the library or requiring a special agent to be onsite in the event of a party or 
gathering of Chinese students. Other incidents were more severe. Accusations of INS agents 
entering, searching, and seizing personal papers and belongings were reported. Even allegations 
of rape, which resulted in suicide or insanity, were made.173 
Returned students and scholars from the United States were utilized, from the outset, as 
political mouthpieces. Chinese newspapers in 1950 and 1951 consistently ran stories of large 
contingents of American-trained professors, researchers, and scholars denouncing the United 
States for their “imperialist aggression” and “exploitation” of the American people by “Wall 
Street Capitalists.” Concerned with establishing their control over China, the Communist Party 
utilized the Chinese student issue to increase their prestige and highlight the necessity that they 
combat the United States, by proving that America had adopted aggressive measures against 
individual Chinese students and scholars. However, most of these excoriations were aimed at 
Chinese living within the newly established People’s Republic and were not meant to directly 
confront the United States on the policy of detaining Chinese students and scholars or barring 
them from exiting. Instead, Chinese students residing in the United States were often subject to 
appeals from the Chinese Communist Party to return and assist in national reconstruction. 
Though these appeals often parroted the Communist Party’s anti-American rhetoric, they 
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generally appealed to Chinese students by speaking of the Communist Party’s “glorious” 
accomplishments and successes in rapidly rebuilding the country.174  
The Chinese Communist Party was not the only entity politicizing the Chinese student issue. 
In the United States, pro-Guomindang (or, at least anti-communist) and Chinese student 
organizations excoriated the People’s Republic for their treatment of returned Chinese students 
and their role as mere satellites of the Soviet Union. In December 1950 the Society of Chinese 
Students and Professionals released a public manifesto, which denounced the Chinese 
Communist Party and claimed they “vigorously protest [the PRC’s] attempt to turn China into a 
battleground for the sake of the Soviet imperialists’ selfish desire for world conquest.”175 In May 
1952, Chih Meng, Director of the China Institute in America, advocated for increased funding 
for Chinese students in the United States to counteract Communist overtures toward them. In his 
appeal, Meng cited the tragic story of an unnamed University of Illinois Professor of 
Mathematics who left for China in 1950. After arriving in China the Communist Party forced 
him to broadcast anti-American statements and praise the virtues of communism. The professor’s 
treatment at the hands of the Communist Party was so bad that he attempted to commit suicide 
by leaping from his window. According to Meng, the professor’s case was not unique and 
numerous other instances could be recounted that spoke to the lengths individuals would go in 
order to escape harsh treatment by the Chinese government.176 
In addition to publishing articles about the actions of Chinese organizations in the United 
States and their denunciations of the Chinese Communist Party, American news outlets also ran 
stories that spoke of the horrors in China that many Western educated Chinese faced. Again, in 
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May 1952, the New York Times ran an article covering the purge of two American educated 
Chinese professors at Yenching University. Originally founded and funded by Western 
missionary groups and religious organizations, Yenching continued to receive American support 
prior to 1949. In 1952, during the reorganization of higher education in China, the university was 
closed and incorporated into Tsinghua University and Peking University. It was during the 
reorganization that Dr. Lu Zhiwei (Lu Chih-wei), President of Yenching University and 
University of Chicago graduate, and Dr. Zhao Zezhen (Chao Tse-chen), Professor of Theology 
and graduate of Vanderbilt University, were purged for failing to adequately confess and adopt 
the “correct” line of thinking. For three days, the two professors were forced to undergo criticism 
by students and faculty of Beijing’s universities. Their situation, it was reported, was not unique 
and Chinese students and scholars who returned to China could expect similar treatment.177  
The American government also utilized the Chinese student issue and recruited Chinese 
students residing in the United States to assist in disseminating propaganda. In June 1951, at the 
behest of Borden, Inc., Kwan Zunxian was invited on a five state tour of the American Midwest 
to experience firsthand the workings of the Borden Company. Originally from Shanghai, and a 
student of nutrition at Cornell University, Kwan met Borden stockholders, employees, farmers, 
suppliers, and customers in order to understand how each part played a role in American 
capitalism. After the five state tour, Kwan “got a chance to tell her home folks” about how the 
company (and capitalism) worked over the Voice of America (VOA).178 Utilizing Voice of 
America broadcasts, the United States also attacked China for their state sanctioned extortion 
campaign, which threatened overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the United States with 
violence against their families if they did not pay a heavy ransom. VOA broadcasts claimed that 
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the Chinese Communist Party had threatened that if money was not forthcoming, “their aged 
mothers or other members of their families in China [would] be tortured” by having them crawl 
over broken glass, “hopping and barking like dogs,” or be subject to “the so-called ‘water 
treatment’.”179 
Evocations of the Chinese student issue were constantly made by both the American and 
Chinese propaganda machines but rarely amounted to more than that. Through 1954, the Chinese 
student issue remained, in terms of the international Sino-American conflict, a bullet point in a 
long list of grievances each held against the other. For the American government, a more 
pressing issue between the two nations was China’s forced retention of American missionaries, 
businessmen, and, after the Korean War, downed pilots and other soldiers. 
During the waning days of the Chinese Civil War, roughly 5,000 Americans, ten percent of 
whom were government officials, rather than flee before the approaching Communist army, 
opted instead to remain with their homes, businesses, and missions.180 Many, however, found the 
Communists less than receptive to their continued residence in China and were incarcerated or 
placed under house arrest. The State Department worked tirelessly to obtain exit visas for 
Americans detained by Chinese authorities and was generally successful. Though there were a 
few high profile instances of capture and detainment, such as the siege of the American 
Consulate in Shenyang and the subsequent arrest of Consulate General Angus I. Ward and his 
staff, or the continued incarceration of Master Sergeant Elmer C. Bender and Chief Electrician 
William C. Smith, most non-official Americans were free to leave with minimal harassment 
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from the Chinese government. Sensing that Chinese officials may be receptive to a continued 
American presence in China, the Department of State, around June 1950, sought to strengthen 
the non-official position of American businessmen and missionaries in the country.181 The 
outbreak of the Korean War changed that. 
America’s participation in the Korean War instigated a massive anti-American propaganda 
campaign in China and the remaining Americans in China suffered for it. Missionaries still in the 
country were arrested and imprisoned or placed under house arrest after the Chinese Communist 
Party promulgated regulations in February 1950 of death or life imprisonment for subversive 
acts. One of the first Americans “martyred” at the hands of Communist authorities was Southern 
Baptist Missionary Dr. Bill Wallace. Originally from Knoxville, Tennessee, Dr. Wallace left for 
China in 1935 and ran a medical mission in Wuzhou (Wuchow) for the following fifteen years. 
On December 19, 1950, Communist officials arrested Dr. Wallace and charged him with 
espionage. Forced to sign a confession, he was held “incommunicado” in a Wuzhou prison for 
the next two months. On February 10, Everley Hayes, a fellow missionary and Superintendent of 
Nurses at Stout Memorial Hospital in Wuzhou, witnessed Communist officials carrying Dr. 
Wallace’s corpse from the prison. Their official explanation was that Dr. Wallace had committed 
suicide. The sketchy details surrounding his death led State Department officials to presume that 
Dr. Wallace had died violently while in prison and engendered concern for the welfare of the 
other Americans remaining in the People’s Republic of China.182 Over the next three years, the 
Department of State sought, through various intermediaries, to affect the release of Americans 
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detained in China.183 By May 1954, however, thirty-two Americans were still listed as 
incarcerated in the People’s Republic of China. The continued detainment of Americans stymied 
Chinese efforts to obtain recognition by the United States or in the United Nations. President 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles consistently raised this point in defense of 
America’s policy of non-recognition of the People’s Republic.184 
By April 1954, with the opening of the Geneva Conference to settle outstanding issues over 
Korea and Indochina (Vietnam), the American government turned to Britain for assistance. 
Acting as intermediary for the United States, British Charge d’Affaires Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, 
negotiated with Chinese representatives for the release of incarcerated Americans on May 17, 
1954. Chinese officials admitted to detaining American pilots downed over Chinese territory but 
claimed this was within their rights since the pilots had violated Chinese airspace. Reporting to 
the American delegation at Geneva, Trevelyan indicated that the Chinese appeared willing to 
negotiate over the return of Americans but reciprocity was demanded in the release of Chinese 
students and scholars detained in the United States.185 Following this initial contact, the State 
Department recommended to the Attorney General and Department of Justice that the cases of 
detained Chinese in the United States be reexamined to determine if they wished to leave. The 
following day, Trevelyan was instructed to inform the Chinese delegation at Geneva that the 
United States may be “flexible on this matter” depending on their attitude regarding the release 
of Americans imprisoned in China.186 After consultation between the Departments of State, 
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Justice, and Defense, Dulles informed the American delegation at Geneva on May 21, that it had 
been “ascertained that very few if any of the small number of Chinese who still wish to return to 
Mainland [China] would have to be held on [the] grounds that their departure would be 
detrimental to the security interests of the United States.” As such, Trevelyan was instructed to 
utilize this information as best he could to bargain with the Chinese delegation.187 
Trevelyan continued negotiating with the Chinese delegation over the following week and, 
on May 27, informed the American delegation of the results of their talks. According to 
Trevelyan, the Chinese delegation was first to raise the issue of Americans detained in China and 
claimed that only 80 remained in the country. The 30 Americans detained in Chinese prisons or 
under house arrest were so held because they had committed and been convicted of crimes or 
entered the country illegally. These Americans, therefore, would be subject to Chinese law and 
their release was non-negotiable. Moreover, the United States had detained between 5,000 and 
6,000 Chinese residing in the country and refused to allow them to depart. Trevelyan corrected 
the Chinese delegation by furnishing State Department figures, which showed that only 120 
students were under strict orders not to depart and of those, many had changed their minds about 
returning to China. Trevelyan recommended to the American delegation and the State 
Department that further talks would be unproductive if carried out only through an intermediary 
and suggested that the United States, possibly with his accompaniment, speak directly with the 
Chinese delegation.  Dulles, however, was convinced that the Chinese were simply using the 
“prisoner issue” as a means to precipitate direct talks and enhance their prestige in Asia by 
propagating the talks as a step toward American recognition of China.188 
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The Chinese delegation intended to make the most of this opportunity and issued a statement 
to the press on May 28, claiming that the United States had been holding illegally 5,000 Chinese 
students but they would be willing to negotiate on the release of Americans detained in China for 
reciprocity on the students detained in the United States. The Department of State quickly 
followed this statement with a report, which claimed that only 120 students were being denied 
permission to leave the country due to security concerns and, despite their disallowance to leave, 
were still free to travel within the country, whereas the Americans in China were not.189 Despite 
Dulles’ antipathy toward direct negotiations with the Chinese, mounting public pressure in the 
United States and China’s refusal to continue negotiations through an intermediary, forced his 
hand. Against concerns that the Chinese would construe the talks as a political victory and a step 
toward recognition, Dulles recommended that Ural Alexis Johnson, American Ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia, be appointed to accompany Trevelyan in talks with the Chinese delegation on 
June 3.190 
Johnson and Trevelyan scheduled the first direct negotiations with the Chinese delegation for 
June 5 in a small sitting room in the Palais de Nations. Having served on the American 
delegation at Panmunjom, Johnson hoped that an informal meeting room would prevent the type 
of acrimonious negotiations he had encountered in Korea and create a relaxing and informal 
atmosphere conducive “for the kind of free-wheeling exploratory discussion that might actually 
lead to progress.”191 Despite the attempt to create an easy atmosphere, the first meeting produced 
nothing substantive but a following meeting was scheduled, at Wang Binnan’s discretion. Wang, 
appointed as the leader of the Chinese delegation, chose a more formal conference room for the 
                                                 
189 “US Refuses Exit for 120 Chinese: State Department Denies Red Report of 5,000 Students Detained Since 
1951,” New York Times (May 29, 1954), 2. 
190 FRUS, 1952-54 XIV, 442-43. 
191 U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984), 234-35. 
  91
next meeting. Though discouraging to Johnson, the meeting produced solid results. 
Arrangements for American prisoners to receive mail were made and the Chinese accepted a list 
of people that the State Department believed were being held in China.192 
Over the next few weeks Johnson and Wang discussed the repatriation of Chinese students 
and American prisoners. Though the Chinese delegation did attempt to use the talks to open 
negotiations on broader issues, Johnson was instructed to negotiate only on the student issue. By 
June 12, with the declining success of the talks in relation to Korea and Indochina, as well as 
repeated attempts by Wang to open and prolong dialogue on different issues, Johnson suspected 
that the Chinese delegation was unlikely to release any detained Americans.193 However, at their 
next meeting on June 15, Wang made several concessions and revealed that the Chinese would 
allow Americans in prison to receive mail and packages and consider commutation of prison 
sentences for Americans with records of good behavior. In exchange Johnson offered to look 
into the cases of the 120 Chinese students detained in China and would inform Wang of those 
who were able to depart. While promising, Wang soon demanded that the two sides make a joint 
statement regarding nationals’ ability to return home but claimed that this would not apply to 
“law violators.”194 Wang’s adamant adherence to releasing a joint statement ended the meeting 
on a vituperative note and no follow-up meeting was scheduled. 
Believing that the release of a few students would facilitate the return of Americans from 
China, Dulles requested to Attorney General Brownell that the United States should, “on the 
basis of a trickle,” allow ten to fifteen of the 120 to leave the country if they wanted. However, 
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Dulles had no desire to enter into a “position of bargaining as with hostages.”195 This release, 
therefore, would be done with no implication of exchange for American prisoners. The 
preliminary reexamination of the cases of detained Chinese students and scholars, as of June 17, 
had revealed only one person whom the Justice Department claimed was still ineligible to go 
back – Qian Xuesen. The rest, according to the Department of Justice, were free to leave if they 
so wished. 
Despite having ended their June 15 meeting on a sour note, Wang Binnan agreed to meet 
with Johnson on June 21 at the Palais des Nations. Johnson opened the meeting by furnishing a 
list of fifteen Chinese students whom the State and Justice Departments agreed were now cleared 
to return to China and that the others who wished to return would soon be notified pending 
further review of their cases. Johnson further informed Wang that of the 120 who had been 
denied permission to leave, roughly half of them now preferred to remain in the United States. 
Grateful for the information, Wang revealed the results of the preliminary investigation on 
Americans detained in China and claimed that of the thirty-two names on the list given earlier, 
thirty were in custody and their cases were pending further review. No further results were 
obtained during the June 21 meeting, except that both sides agreed to continue meetings at the 
consular level. Johnson returned to Prague, expecting his part in the issue to be resolved.196  
Following the first meeting in Geneva, many Chinese students who wished to return to China 
now found their path unblocked. Over the next two months 430 Chinese students applied to the 
State Department for exit visas and, by mid-August, twenty-two had been approved, 124 
provisionally denied, and the remaining 284 pending further review.197 By December 14, the 
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number of cases still under review dwindled to just thirty-five. Wanting to press the issue, 
Beijing released a statement over the radio offering to enter into negotiations for the release of 
eleven captured American airmen for the release of the thirty-five remaining students in the 
United States. The State Department, still emphatically opposed to the idea of “hostage 
negotiations,” released a statement on December 14, which vigorously denied that the two issues 
were interrelated and that the remaining cases under review would be completed as expeditiously 
as possible.198  
For some this was not soon enough. The sentiment among the Chinese students still 
disallowed from leaving mounted over the several months between the June announcement that 
they would soon be able to leave and the end of the year. On the same day that the State 
Department announced that only thirty-five cases remained pending, the New York Times 
reported that two Chinese students living in Pasadena, California, Zheng Benhao (Cheng Pen-
hau) and Han Yinggu (Han Ying-ku), had petitioned the United Nations asking that they be 
allowed to return to China.199 Four days later, eight more Chinese students, four in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and four in Chicago, “volunteered” to be traded for the eleven United States 
airmen in China; all but one indicated they were ready to leave immediately.200 The following 
day Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, received an appeal signed by 
thirty-one Chinese students in the United States asking that their case be placed before the 
Human Rights Commission in the United Nations.201 However, not all Chinese students in the 
United States were in favor of releasing the thirty-five who still wished to leave. The Chinese 
Catholic Students Society, which was composed of roughly 1,000 Chinese undergraduate and 
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graduate students, appealed to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles not to initiate 
a trade for the thirty-five.202 
Despite the State Department’s attempts to dissociate the return of imprisoned Americans in 
China with the return of Chinese students and scholars in the United States, public pressure was 
mounting to resolve the issue and bring the Americans home. Massachusetts Representative, and 
retiring Speaker of the House, Joeseph W. Martin, Jr., and Senators John J. Sparkman of 
Alabama and Homer Ferguson of Michigan, concurred that if thirty-five more Chinese students 
wished to return, there should be no impediment to their departure if it could lead to the 
exchange of imprisoned Americans.203 This sentiment continued to build through early 1955, and 
was exacerbated by Communist officials, who, in January, offered to let relatives of the 
imprisoned Americans visit them in China.204 Various United Nations missions to China, led by 
Hammarskjold, between January and March, further kept the prisoner issue firmly on the minds 
of Americans back home.  
While the Hammarskjold missions helped to dispel some of Beijing’s suspicions and 
facilitated an understanding of American arguments concerning imprisoned Americans, they 
failed to produce concrete results toward commuting the prison sentences. As a result, in March, 
the Eisenhower Administration began to give “serious study” toward lifting the ban on issuance 
of exit visas to Chinese students in the United States. On March 3, acting Secretary of State 
Herbert Hoover, Jr. sent a memorandum to President Eisenhower to outline the problem. 
According to State Department estimates, roughly 4,800 Chinese students had come to the 
United States between 1946 and 1950. Of those, approximately 800 left before the outbreak of 
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the Korean War and returned to China before President Truman declared a state of emergency 
and denied their departure from the United States. Between the outbreak of the Korean War and 
the talks at Geneva in June 1954, 434 Chinese students had applied for permission to exit the 
country and 310 had been allowed. The remaining 124 were “provisionally denied” for security 
purposes but, following the Geneva talks, were re-canvassed to determine whether they still 
preferred to leave for China or stay in the United States. Sixty-four of the 124 indicated they still 
wished to return to China and twenty-seven were notified they could leave the country, fifteen of 
whom had left immediately after being notified. This left a remaining thirty-five students and 
scholars still under orders not to depart from the country due to security purposes. After the State 
Department and Attorney General publicly removed the ban on Chinese exiting the country at 
the end of June, a further thirty-six students and scholars had applied for exit visas but their cases 
remained pending as of March 1955, leaving seventy-one Chinese students and scholars still 
technically disallowed from departing the country. In light of China’s adamant demands that the 
student and prisoner issues were inextricably linked, Hoover informed Eisenhower that the State 
Department would soon have a policy recommendation.205 
The following month, after “thorough consideration,” Dulles informed President Eisenhower 
that the State Department had concluded, “in light of [American] discussions with the Chinese 
Communists at Geneva, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold’s negotiations at Peiping 
[Beijing], and other evidence, that detention in the United States of students who have been 
found eligible for departure by the Immigration and Naturalization Service under existing 
regulations would not contribute to the release of the imprisoned Americans. On the other hand, 
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release of the students would enable the U.S. to press its case against the Chinese Communists 
more effectively in the United Nations and elsewhere.” Dulles thus concluded that the State 
Department would no longer stop Chinese students who wished to leave the country and were 
found eligible to do so by INS. Citing section 215 (a) of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, 
Dulles did, however, retain the right to continue screening those whose scientific and technical 
training could be considered prejudicial to the United States; though he anticipated that “few, if 
any, applicants are likely to be denied permission to depart.”206 
Dulles’ reversal in position was announced on April 3 by State Department spokesman 
Henry Suydam, who reiterated that the students were never held as hostages, as China had 
claimed, and the decision was made to lift the ban in the hopes of “prodding [Beijing] to 
reciprocate by turning loose the fifteen United States airmen and forty-one civilians imprisoned 
or refused exit permits by the Chinese Communists.” Moreover, the release of the students would 
strengthen the United States’ moral position in negotiations with Beijing. It was also announced 
that the State Department program of emergency assistance to Chinese students was set to expire 
on June 30 and that any student who wished to return to China but lacked the funds to do so 
needed to apply for assistance before then.207 Ten days later, on April 13, the SS President 
Cleveland set sail from San Francisco for Hong Kong with several of the seventy-six on board.208  
Those who remained to complete their education, however, soon engendered the ire of INS 
officials. In June 1955, it was reported that many of seventy-six who decided to stay and 
complete their education were being harassed by INS officials with threats of arrest and 
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deportation, as well as arbitrary immigration procedures and even notices to leave the country 
that provided only two or three weeks forewarning. J.M. Swing, Commissioner of Immigration, 
denied the allegations but a series of litigations against the INS dispelled his claims.209 These 
arbitrary deportation notices soon became a sticking point in the consular talks at Geneva in July, 
when Shen Ping, Chinese consul, claimed that the Chinese government had received numerous 
letters and complaints from Chinese students in the United States claiming they were told to be 
out of the country before September or they would be arrested by INS.210 This point would later 
emerge again in August at the ambassadorial talks in Geneva. 
While the State Department announcement in early April rescinded the restraining orders 
against seventy-six Chinese students and scholars, six still found their cases under review. On 
May 4, President Eisenhower’s Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) met to discuss, among 
other things, the cases of Qian Xuesen and David Kahsin Wang. The OCB, designed to 
coordinate and implement national security policy across several government agencies, 
recommended that their cases not be approved and they not be granted permission to leave. 
Wang, like Qian, possessed advanced scientific knowledge in physics, and his employment at the 
Aerojet Engineering Corporation in Azusa, California convinced the OCB that his return would 
be inimical to national security.211 Eisenhower disagreed. 
On June 10, Eisenhower and Dulles met to discuss the repatriation of Americans still 
imprisoned in China and the release of Chinese students. Dulles, still adamant that the student 
and prisoner issues be dissociated from one another, recommended that the United States take a 
strong stand on the return of the Americans in China. The President countered with his belief that 
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the United States simply was not in a strong moral position to take this stance. The Chinese 
students had come to the United States, stated Eisenhower, with the implied understanding that 
they would be able to return home after their education was completed. Dulles countered by 
stating that Americans had similarly entered China under the same understanding. Regardless, 
over the course of the meeting, Eisenhower informed Dulles that he did not think the technical or 
scientific knowledge, acquired in the United States by those still detained, was as valuable as 
commonly believed. In the President’s estimation, the United States should no longer continue to 
deny their exit and should allow any who wished to depart the freedom to leave. Citing two cases 
that the Department of Defense was “dubious” about due to their knowledge of “highly classified 
material,” Dulles claimed he would look into the matter further.212 
By mid-June Eisenhower made it clear to Dulles that the United States should no longer 
prevent the return to China of any Chinese student who desired to leave. Still intensely 
concerned with regaining Americans held prisoner in China, Dulles finally gave in on the 
dissociation of the student and prisoner issues and on June 11 informed the Department of 
Defense that the restriction on Qian Xuesen and David Wang should be lifted. Colonel Andrew 
Jackson Goodpaster, Staff Secretary for the Department of Defense and Liaison Officer to the 
President, met with Eisenhower on June 13 and the two agreed that no impediment to the release 
of Qian or Wang would be enforced.213  
With the restriction lifted, Dulles agreed to conduct ambassadorial-level talks with the 
People’s Republic at Geneva beginning August 1, 1955. U. Alexis Johnson was again appointed 
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to represent the United States, while Wang Bingnan was reappointed as representative of the 
People’s Republic of China. On July 29, Dulles provided Johnson with a list of eighteen points to 
direct the negotiations. Since the primary purpose of the August Geneva talks were to settle “the 
matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries…,” other 
issues were considered ancillary and, therefore, should not be discussed until a satisfactory 
conclusion was reached on the issue of repatriation.214  
While the first meeting on August 1 was little more than a formality, with Johnson and Wang 
agreeing to terms of the negotiations, the next meeting on August 2 produced concrete results. 
Wang opened the meeting by announcing that the People’s Republic had released the eleven 
airmen held as prisoner and he furnished a list of names of the remaining Americans in China for 
the American delegation. In return, Wang asked that the United States furnish a list of names of 
the seventy-six Chinese students and scholars who had been granted permission to leave the 
United States in order for the Chinese government to follow up on their status and ensure that 
they had, in fact, arrived in China, as well as a list of all Chinese nationals residing in America. 
Wang further suggested that India act as mediator in the resolution of the student issue by 
checking on the status of Chinese nationals within the United States. Johnson replied that he 
would look into these propositions and the second meeting ended amicably.215 
Johnson and Wang eventually met fourteen more times over the course of the month before 
an agreement was reached, on September 10, 1955. The United States agreed that, “The United 
States recognizes that Chinese in the United States who desire to return to the People’s Republic 
of China are entitled to do so and declares that is has adopted and will further adopt appropriate 
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measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.” The Republic of India was 
also granted permission to act as intermediary for any Chinese student who felt that their 
departure was being obstructed by American officials. The People’s Republic of China made an 
identical statement in regards to Americans in China and permitted the Government of the 
United Kingdom to act as intermediary on behalf of any Americans who felt that their exit was 
being prevented.216 
On September 17, 1955, Qian Xuesen stood at the Los Angeles harbor with his wife and 
children and prepared to board the SS President Cleveland bound for Hong Kong. Surrounded by 
reporters, Qian was quoted as saying, “I do not plan to come back. I have no reason to come 
back. I have thought about it for a long time. I plan to do my best to help the Chinese people 
build up their nation to where they can live with dignity and happiness.”217 Qian and two other 
Chinese scientists were the last of the Chinese students and scholars to return to the People’s 
Republic of China.218 
 
Both the United States and People’s Republic of China had, from the very beginning, 
politicized the issues surrounding Chinese students in the United States. The Chinese Communist 
Party, in their calls to combat ‘American imperialism’ and foster anti-American sentiment during 
the Korean War, utilized Chinese students in their propaganda claims by proving that the United 
States forcibly detained and refused to allow them to return to China. Those who did return were 
heralded as heroes, survivors of American mistreatment, and firsthand witnesses of the ‘imperial’ 
policies of the United States. However, their utility in China was limited mostly to their 
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propaganda value, especially during the Korean War. Chinese propaganda ran several open 
letters and editorials from Chinese students who had returned from the United States, eager to aid 
China and proud to fight against America in the Korean War. Conversely, the United States 
attempted to dissuade Chinese students from returning to the People’s Republic by highlighting 
the brutal policies of torture and murder that the Communist Party had enacted against the 
Chinese people. Through Voice of America broadcasts, the American government used Chinese 
students to disseminate pro-American messages and information. Concurrently, Chinese student 
organizations were themselves involved in politicizing the student issue by writing to the 
American and Chinese governments, as well as the United Nations.  
That Chinese students and the Chinese student issue became the principal political precipitant 
for direct negotiations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, when 
viewed in this context, is unsurprising. Both countries had politicized the students since 1949 and 
their use as political pawns in the hopes of affecting better Sino-American relations at Geneva 
was part of a process that had begun with the inception of the People’s Republic. However, their 
importance to both the United States and China was peripheral at best. This is evidenced by the 
marginal position in the People’s Republic of those who returned and the American 
government’s slow and haphazard response to the realities of the Chinese situation in the United 
States. Moreover, had China not conducted the same policy in regards to American nationals, it 
is unlikely that the United States would have agreed to such high-level talks, especially in the 
mid-1950s. This is clearly evidenced by Dulles’ view of the Geneva talks, which were viewed as 
an expedient to recover Americans detained in China; all other issues were secondary.219 For 
China, the use of the student issue opened the United States to direct talks and allowed the 
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People’s Republic to gain another propaganda victory in Asia. Having first fought America to a 
stalemate on the Korean Peninsula, the Geneva talks were viewed as a chance to work toward 
recognition and a seat at the United Nations. Yet, the students were never important in and of 
themselves. While some, such as Qian Xuesen, did go on to contribute significantly to China’s 
atomic program, or other scientific breakthroughs, the overt reliance on the Soviet Union and 
Soviet practices during the mid-1950s diminished any chance that the students and scholars 
would return and contribute anything meaningful to the People’s Republic of China. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
Following a long-established, yet unofficially endorsed precedent, the American 
government initially attempted to utilize Chinese students as subversive, pro-American agents of 
democracy to influence and direct modernization paradigms in China. This policy continued to 
dictate American action toward the early People’s Republic of China with the intent of 
destabilizing the Chinese Communist regime. Yet, following China’s intervention in the Korean 
War, the American government adopted a more active policy regarding Chinese students in an 
effort to deny the PRC access to scientific and technical information. Considered national 
security risks, the American government denied Chinese students exit permits and forcibly 
retained those with scientific and technical knowledge. By 1955, however, the political value of 
these Chinese students again shifted. Between 1948 and 1955, the United States politicized 
Chinese students and actively attempted to utilize them to destabilize the CCP and deny the PRC 
access to scientific and technical information before, ultimately, utilizing them as political capital 
for exchange of American citizens similarly detained in China. 
Sino-American education exchange, from its inception, consistently focused on technical 
training for Chinese students. Both the Qing and Guomindang governments were cognizant of 
China’s need for engineers, scientists, and technicians, and viewed education exchange with the 
United States as an expedient for producing these highly trained specialists. Though ambivalent 
about overt reliance on Western education, the exigencies of modernization programs took 
precedence and the Chinese government dispatched large contingents of students to the United 
States, especially following the cessation of the Second World War. Conversely, American 
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conceptualizations of education exchange focused on the utility of Chinese students as agents of 
democracy. Following the remission of the Boxer Indemnity Fund in 1905, the United States 
government became more actively involved in education exchange and sought to utilize Chinese 
students as political pawns, believing them to be pro-American “forces for democracy.” 
Convinced that they would fulfill influential roles in government and business, the American 
government hoped that by acquainting Chinese intellectuals with the American socio-economic 
system they would promote a pro-American agenda, thereby providing the United States 
influence over Chinese patterns of development. This conception of the role of education 
exchange remained unaltered until China’s intervention in the Korean War. 
Li Hongshan argues that beginning in 1900, with the remission of the Boxer Indemnity 
Fund, both the American and Chinese governments actively engaged in education exchange, 
wresting it away from private enterprises and transforming it into a state function for domestic 
and foreign politics. Termination of education exchange, therefore, was useful to achieve short-
term political and diplomatic goals.220 Yet, while abrogation of institutional mechanisms for 
exchanging students with China ended in 1950, a large cohort of Chinese students and 
intellectuals remained in the United States. Initially inclined to allow these students to return to 
their homes on the Mainland, the American government provided monetary assistance for their 
return upon completion of their studies. This policy conformed to long-standing American 
conceptualizations of education exchange and the role of Western-educated students and 
intellectuals. The utility of Chinese students, however, shifted around 1948. Still considered 
democratic agents, it was hoped that their return to China would have a subversive and 
destabilizing effect on the Chinese Communist regime.  
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Intervention by the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army in Korea altered American 
perceptions of the utility of Chinese students once again and the American government came to 
view their knowledge as potentially damaging, not to the PRC, but to American national 
security. An overly hostile Chinese Communist regime with access to specialized scientific and 
technical knowledge presented a threat to the United States and the State Department enacted 
interdictions against Chinese intellectuals on departure from the country. In the case of Sino-
American relations, the mechanisms of education exchange were deemed less important than the 
individuals themselves. By emphasizing the utility of scientifically and technically trained 
intellectuals to prevent dissemination of information to the PRC, the American government 
expanded its war against China to the intellectual front as well as the traditional battlefield. Even 
after signing the ceasefire agreement at Panmunjom, American officials continued waging an 
intellectual Cold War against the People’s Republic.  
Mitigating the efficacy of this policy, however, was the Communist Party’s overt reliance 
on the Soviet Union. In the economic, industrial, and educational sectors, the CCP elided all 
Western influence in favor of Soviet models of development. Moreover, the Chinese 
Communists and Mao were intensely concerned over the political pedigree of intellectuals in 
China during the 1950s and enacted numerous “reforms” designed to “correct” their thinking and 
achieve political homogeneity. Had the American government allowed Chinese students and 
intellectuals to return, it is therefore unlikely that many would have been granted positions which 
allowed them to utilize their knowledge in a prejudicial manner against the United States.221 
Instead, the CCP generally utilized returning students as political propaganda pieces against the 
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United States during the Korean War and the Geneva talks in 1954 and 1955. Substantiating 
Chinese excoriations was the discriminatory treatment Chinese intellectuals received while in the 
United States.  
Disallowed from returning to the Mainland, many Chinese students and intellectuals 
endured harsh treatment from the Department of Justice and Immigration and Naturalization 
Services officials. Since most Chinese students came to the United States on student visas, their 
continued residence after graduation was technically illegal. Though the Department of State 
enacted policies designed to accommodate and alleviate the Chinese student’s situation, they 
were sporadic and slowly implemented. Compounded by the anti-Communist paranoia during 
the early to mid-1950s, many Chinese students received contradictory orders from the 
Departments of State and Justice. While officials from the State Department told Chinese 
students they could not leave, Department of Justice and INS officials repeatedly served Chinese 
students with orders of deportation. In some instances, INS officials, projecting suspicions of 
pro-communist sympathies onto Chinese students and intellectuals, forcefully interviewed them 
to ascertain their political loyalties. Thus, many found themselves under intense scrutiny and 
were forced to report their whereabouts and occupational statuses to government officials every 
three months. 
The institutional confusion between the Departments of State and Justice, besides 
providing the Chinese Communist Party with polemical ammunition, also intensely concerned 
American officials. In response to both foreign and domestic pressure, often from the students 
themselves, Congress introduced newly restructured immigration policies designed, in part, to 
alleviate the Chinese student problem. While not a panacea, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 did 
allow for students to apply for permanent residence. Though, as Yelong Han argues, the choice 
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to do so was effectively removed since Chinese students were still disallowed from leaving.222 
Moreover, the decision to partially remove barriers to immigration was made by the considerable 
administrative and financial burdens that encumbered the American government in their decision 
to retain such a large cohort of individuals. Regardless, restructuring of immigration policy to 
accommodate Chinese intellectuals and students highlights the shift in emphasis away from 
utilizing the institutional mechanism of education exchange in favor of individuals. Furthermore, 
it allowed the United States to retain well-educated Chinese intellectuals and continue a policy of 
denying the PRC advanced Western scientific and technical knowledge.  
Retaining Chinese intellectuals and students also provided the American government 
with a source of propaganda material for its own purposes. While the CCP utilized returning 
students and their stories of harsh treatment while abroad to vituperate the United States, the 
American government utilized them to promote a pro-American image of democracy and 
freedom to the Chinese people over Voice of America broadcasts. In this way, small threads of 
the long-standing notion of Chinese students as subversive democratic forces continued into the 
mid-1950s. However, by 1954-55, with increasing Sino-American conflicts in the Taiwan Straits 
and elsewhere, the two governments agreed to bilateral negotiations at Geneva and Chinese 
students finally came to the foreground in both American and Chinese political and diplomatic 
thinking.  
Disparaging the Chinese Communists for detaining downed American pilots, American 
negotiators determined to secure their release through diplomatic channels. Though initially 
rebuffing Chinese offers to exchange American pilots for detained Chinese students and 
intellectuals, President Eisenhower soon came to see the utility of these individuals as political 
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capital and, over the protestations of John Foster Dulles, advocated for the exchange. In August 
1955, the United States and People’s Republic of China formally agreed to the exchange and 
allowed those Chinese remaining in America who wished to return permission to do so.  
In tracing the shifting American perceptions of education exchange, it can be seen that 
the American government, beginning in 1905, continually attempted to direct and influence 
modernization paradigms in China. First through a soft power approach, which viewed Chinese 
students as potential democratic forces who would work behind the scenes to implement policies 
conducive to American interests. The rise of the Chinese Communist Party did not alter this 
basic concept and through late-1950, the notion of subversive democratic forces continued to 
dictate American rationale regarding Chinese students. However, following China’s intervention 
in the Korean War, the American government adopted a more active policy to physically restrain 
Chinese students and intellectuals from returning to the Mainland in an effort to deny the PRC 
access to scientific and technical information. Utility thus shifted from the institution of 
education exchange to the individual and their knowledge. Throughout the early 1950s this 
policy of waging an intellectual Cold War against the People’s Republic continued. In diplomatic 
affairs this also resulted in utilizing students and intellectuals as propaganda pieces to wage a 
polemical war. Domestically, retention of Chinese students and intellectuals forced a 
restructuring of immigration policies to alleviate their situations. Finally, following increasingly 
hostile relations and a desire to return Americans imprisoned in China, the American government 
viewed Chinese students as political capital, useful to exchange for Americans. The Sino-
American Cold War thus politicized Chinese students and increased American governmental 
attention toward them, especially in the early Cold War era between 1948 and 1955.  
 
  109
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Archival Material 
 
Dulles, John Foster. Memorandum for U. Alexis Johnson, July 29, 1955. Box 11. John Foster  
Dulles Papers. Subject Subseries, Wang-Johnson Talks – Prisoners of War 1955 (2)  
Folder. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
Dulles, John Foster. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, March 24, 1954. Box 1.  
John Foster Dulles Papers. White House Memoranda, Meetings with the President 1954.  
(4) Folder. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
Dulles, John Foster. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, June 10, 1955. Box 3.  
John Foster Dulles Papers. White House Memoranda Subseries, Meetings with the  
President 1955 (4) Folder. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
Dulles, John Foster. Memorandum of Conversation, August 5, 1955. Box 3. John Foster Dulles  
Papers. White House Memoranda, Meetings with the President 1955 (3) Folder. Dwight  
D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
Dulles, John Foster. Telephone Call to Mr. Brownell, June 17, 1954. Box 2. John Foster Dulles  
Papers. Telephone Conversations. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Potentialities of Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in  
the United States, May 1954. Box 13. Records of the White House Office, Office of the  
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. FBI Series, FBI Publications Subseries.  
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
Linton, Clarence. Letter to Ernest G. Osborne, March 8, 1951. Box 42. White House Central  
Files: Confidential File. State Department File Series, Correspondence File Subseries.  
Folder 3. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
 
Linton, Clarence. Letter to John R. Steelman, April 17, 1951. Box 42. White House Central  
Files: Confidential File. State Department File Series, Correspondence Subseries. Folder  
2. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
 
Memorandum for the President, April 1, 1955. Box 5. Dulles-Herter Series. April 1955 Folder  
(2). Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
Memorandum for the President, March 3, 1955. Box 5. Dulles-Herter Series. March 1955 Folder.  
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
 
 
  110
Note to the Secretary of State, July 29, 1955. Box 11. John Foster Dulles Papers. Subject  
Subseries, Wang-Johnson Talks – Prisoners of War 1955 (2) Folder. Dwight D.  
Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
“Obituary.” Box 19. Promise, Inc., Records MS 585, Dr. Pak-Chue-chan Series 3, Folder 19/2.  
Special Collections Department. Iowa State University. 
 
Staats, Elmer B. Memorandum to Joseph May Swing, May 9, 1955. Box 27. OCB Central Files,  
1948-61. OCB 091.China File 4(4) [January-November 1955] Folder. Dwight D.  
Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
 
Steelman, John R. Letter to Dr. Ernest G. Osborne, April 6, 1951. Box 42. White House Central  
Files: Confidential File. State Department File Series, Correspondence File Subseries.  
Folder 2. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
 
 
Published Documents 
 
A Survey of Chinese Students in American Universities and Colleges in the Past One Hundred  
Years. New York: China Institute in America, 1954. 
 
Chih Meng. “Chinese Students in Need, November 1, 1949.” News Bulletin 25, no. 2. New York:  
Institute of International Education, Inc., 1949. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 VI. Washington DC: US Government Printing  
Office, 1976. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 VII. Washington DC: US Government Printing  
Office, 1983. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54 XIV. Washington DC: US Government Printing  
Office, 1985. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57 VII. Washington DC: US Government Printing  
Office, 1986. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57 VIII. Washington DC: US Government Printing  
Office, 1986. 
 
Hanson, Haldore. The Cultural Cooperation Program, 1938-1943. Washington DC: US  
Government Printing Office, 1944. 
 
Hinton, Harold, ed. “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between  
the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, 14 February 1950.” In The  
People’s Republic of China 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey 1. Wilmington,  
Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980. 
  111
 
Institute of International Education. “$2,500,000 Needed to Assist Chinese Students, March 1,  
1949.” News Bulletin 24, no. 6. New York: Institute of International Education, Inc.,  
1949. 
 
Institute of International Education. “Emergency Fund Provided for Students, October 1, 1948.”  
News Bulletin 24, no. 1. New York: Institute of International Education, Inc., 1948. 
 
Institute of International Education. “Financial Problems of Chinese Students, October 1, 1948.”  
News Bulletin 24, no. 1. New York: Institute of International Education, Inc., 1948. 
 
Institute of International Education. “US Grant for Chinese Students, May 1, 1949.” News  
Bulletin 24, no. 8. New York: Institute of International Education, Inc., 1949. 
 
International Education Exchange Service. Department of State. The Program of Emergency Aid  
to Chinese Students, 1949-1955. Washington DC: 1956. 
 
Klinger, Robert B. “Michigan Faces Financial Problem, April 1, 1949.” News Bulletin 24, no. 7.  
New York: Institute of International Education, Inc., 1949. 
 
Liu Shaoqi. Collected Works of Liu Shaoqi 1-2. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969. 
 
Mao Zedong. The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung 1-5. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965. 
 
United States. “Public Law 203.” August 7, 1953. United States Statutes at Large, 1953 67. Chp.  
336, sec. 4. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1953. 
 
United States. “Public Law 414.” June 27, 1952. United States Statutes at Large, 1952. Chp.  
477. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1953. 
 
United States. “Treaty between the United States and China, concerning immigration.”  
November 17, 1880. US Statutes at Large 22 1881/1883, art. 1. Washington DC:  
Government Printing Office, 1883.  
 
United States. “United States Policy Toward China, February 25, 1949.” State Department  
Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1949 III. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983. 
 
United States. “United States Policy Toward China, September 7, 1948.” State Department  
Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1948 II. New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983. 
 
US Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Relief of Chinese Students. 81st Cong., 1st  
sess., July 13, 1949. Report no. 1039. 
 
 
 
 
  112
US Congress. House. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. “Statement of Reverend  
John G. Magee, Minister of St. John’s Episcopal Church, Washington DC. In Repeal of  
the Chinese Exclusion Acts: Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration and  
Naturalization. 78th Cong., 1st sess. Washington DC: United States Government Printing  
Office, 1943. 
 
US Congress. House. Message from the President of the United States of America. Refugee  
Relief Act of 1953. 84th Cong., 1st sess., May 27, 1955. Document no. 173. 
 
US Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Aid Appropriation Act, 1950. 81st  
Cong., 1st sess., July 30, 1949. Report no. 812. 
 
 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
 
Abel, Elie. “Chinese Students Free to Go Home as US Ends Curb: Release of 76 Specialists is  
Aimed to Spur Peiping Action on Detained Americans.” New York Times, April 13, 1955. 
 
Chia To-fu. “The Advance of China’s Industry.” People’s China no. 11, June 1, 1953. 
 
Chiang Yin-en. “Yenching – the Rebirth of a University.” People’s China 3, no. 10, May 16,  
1951. 
 
Fine, Benjamin. “6,000 Students Stranded, Stranded in US, Resist Red Lures to Return to  
China.” New York Times, May 11, 1952. 
 
Fine, Benjamin. “U.S. Grant to Ease Crises for Foreign Students Asked.” New York Times,  
January 27, 1949. 
 
Han To-fu. “Soviet Assistance and the Development of Chinese Economic Reconstruction in the  
Past Two Years.” In Soviet Press Translations 7, no. 9, May 1, 1952. 
 
Hsu Chih. “Blast Furnace No. 8: How the Workers of Anshan Built China’s First and Biggest  
Automatic Furnace.” People’s China no. 10, May 16, 1953. 
 
Liang Chen-ming. “Hsinkang – North China’s New Port.” People’s China no. 2, January 16,  
1953. 
 
Osnon, Evan. “The Two Lives of Qian Xuesen.” The New Yorker (November 3, 2009):  
http://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/the-two-lives-of-qian-xuesen (accessed  
March 12, 2015). 
 
Pai Hsiang-yin. “Sino-Soviet Trade.” People’s China no. 12, June 16, 1953. 
 
Patterson, Lindesay. “Red China Offers to Let Relatives Visit US Airmen.” New York Times,  
January 22, 1955. 
  113
 
Reston, James. “Chinese Students in Country Stir Fight of US Agencies: State Department  
Wants Law Used Allowing Full-time Jobs – Deportation is Opposed.” New York Times,  
March 9, 1951. 
 
Salisbury, Harrison E. “Us Pledge Given in Chinese Cases.” New York Times, June 4, 1955. 
 
Su Chung-yu. “The First Year of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.” People’s China 3, no. 4, February 16,  
1951. 
 
Survey of China Mainland Press 1950-1956. Hong Kong: US Consulate General. 
 
Tai Yen-nien. “China’s First Automatic Power Plant.” People’s China no. 9, May 1, 1953. 
 
Vysokov. “Today in Tsing-tao, 8 July 1952 (Pravda).” In Soviet Press Translations 7, no. 16. 
 
Wei Yi. “The Rate of China’s Industrial Growth.” People’s China, October 1, 1955. 
 
 
Articles 
 
Chiang Yung-chen. “Chinese Students in America in the Early Twentieth Century: Preliminary  
Reflections on a Research Topic.” Chinese Studies in History 36, no. 3 (Spring 2003):  
38-62. 
 
Han Yelong. “An Untold Study: American Policy Toward Chinese Students in the United States,  
1949-1955.” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 77- 
99. 
 
Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. “The Reorganisation of Chinese Higher Education, 1949-61.” The China  
Quarterly, no. 19 (July-September 1964), 128-60. 
 
Hsu, Madeline. “Befriending the “Yellow Peril”: Chinese Students and Intellectuals and the  
Liberalization of US Immigration Laws, 1950-1965.” The Journal of American-East  
Asian Relations 16, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 139-162. 
 
Hsu, Madeline. “The Disappearance of America’s Cold War Chinese Refugees, 1948-1966.”  
Journal of American Ethnic History 31, no. 4 (Summer 2012): 12-33. 
 
Hunt, Michael H. “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal.” The  
Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (May 1972): 539-59. 
 
Lai, Him Mark. “The Chinese-Marxist Left, Chinese Students and Scholars in America, and the  
the New China: Mid-1940s to Mid-1950s.” Chinese America: History and Perspectives  
18 (January 2004): 7-27. 
 
  114
Lee, Rose Hum. “The Stranded Chinese in the United States.” The Phylon Quarterly 19, no. 2  
(2nd Quarter, 1958): 180-94. 
 
Lehman, Herbert H. “Senator Lehman on the McCarran-Walter Act.” Social Service Review 27,  
no. 1 (March 1953): 102-04. 
 
Priestly, K.E. “The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.” Pacific Affairs 25, no. 3 (September  
1952): 287-92. 
 
Zhang Baichung, Zhang Jiuchun, and Yao Fang. “Technology Transfer from the Soviet Union to  
the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1966.” Comparative Technology Transfer and  
Society 4, no. 2 (August 2008): 105-67. 
 
 
Books 
 
Bernstein, Thomas P. and Li Hua-yu eds. China Learns From the Soviet Union, 1949-Present.  
New York: Lexington Books, 2010. 
 
Bieler, Stacy. “Patriots” or “Traitors”?: A History of American-Educated Chinese Students.  
Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 2004. 
 
Borisov, O.B. and B.T. Koloskov. Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1973: A Brief History. Translated  
by Yuri Shirokov. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975. 
 
Chang, Iris. Thread of the Silkworm. New York: Basic Books, 1995. 
 
Dirlik, Arif. “Modernism and Antimodernism in Mao Zedong’s Marxism.” In Critical  
Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought. Edited by Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick  
Knight. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 1997. 
 
Fairbank, John King. The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985. New York: HarperPerennial,  
1987. 
 
Ferrell, Robert H., ed. Off the Record: Private Papers of Harry S. Truman. New York: Penguin  
Books, 1980. 
 
Graham, Loren R. The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet  
Union. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
 
Gold, Martin B. Forbidden Citizens: Chinese Exclusion and the U.S. Congress: A Legislative  
History. Alexandria, VA: The Capitol.Net, Inc., 2012. 
 
Hunt, Michael H. The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914.  
New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. 
 
  115
Ji Chaozhu. The Man on Mao’s Right: From Harvard Yard to Tiananmen Square, My Life Inside  
China’s Foreign Ministry. New York: Random House, 2008. 
 
Johnson, U. Alexis. The Right Hand of Power. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984. 
 
Kirby, William C. “Engineering China: Birth of the Developmental State, 1928-37.” In  
Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond. Edited by Yeh Wen-hsin.  
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
 
Kung, Samuel Shi-shin. “Personal and Professional Problems of Chinese Students and Former  
Students in the New York Metropolitan Area.” PhD. Dissertation, Teachers College,  
Columbia University, 1955. 
 
Li Hongshan. US-China Educational Exchange: State, Society, and Intercultural Relations,  
1905-1950. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008. 
 
Liao Kuang-sheng. Antiforeignism and Modernization in China, 1860-1980: Linkage Between  
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984. 
 
Luella, Miner. “Prisoner in Peking (1900).” In American History Told by Contemporaries 5.  
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929. 
 
Melby, John F. The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War, China 1945-49. New York:  
Anchor Books, 1971. 
 
Parson, William Barclay. An American Engineer in China. New York: McClure, Phillips & Co.,  
1900. 
 
 Phipps, Virginia E., Vernal L. Wilson, and Velma A Caruth. China Journal 1889-1900: An  
American Missionary Family During the Boxer Rebellion. New York: Charles Scribner’s  
Sons, 1989. 
 
Rhoads, Edward J.M. Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the  
United States, 1872-81. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011. 
 
Schram, Stuart. The Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui. After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War.  
Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011. 
 
Smith, Arthur H. China and America Today: A Study of Conditions and Relations. New York:  
Fleming H. Revell Company, 1907. 
 
Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961. 
 
 
  116
Stiffler, Douglas. “Three Blows of the Shoulder Pole: Soviet Experts at Chinese People’s  
University, 1950-57.” In China Learns From the Soviet Union: 1949-Present. Edited by  
Thomas P. Bernstein and Li Hua-yu. New York: Lexington Books, 2010. 
 
Tien Hsue-shen. “Wo Zai Meiguo De Zaoyu [My Bitter Experience in the United States.” In  
Bazhishe Xiangei Zhuguo [Intellectual Constributions for the Homeland]. Translated by  
Ellen Yueng. Hong Kong: Zhoumo Bao, 1956. Reprinted in Chinese American Voices:  
From the Gold Rush to the Present. Edited by Judy Yung, Gordon H. Chang, and Him  
Mark Lai. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. 
 
William Lyon Phelps: Autobiography and Letters. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939. 
 
Zhang Shu Guang. Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet  
Alliance, 1949-63. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001. 
 
 
 
